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Abstract
The claim of this thesis is that Davidson’s Principle of Charity is not a necessary 
condition on constructing a theory of meaning for a natural language. There are 
means other than the application of Davidson’s Principle of Charity by which an 
interpreter can achieve the disentanglement of questions of meaning and belief for 
which Davidson’s principle was enlisted. These other means consist in the 
employment of evidence about speakers, and speaker’s interaction with their 
environment, from the human sciences such as psychology and linguistics. The thesis 
includes a detailed account of the content, status and development of Davidson’s 
Principle of Charity placed in the wider context of his approach to the philosophy of 
language. Davidson’s views on the evidence available to the interpreter are examined 
and found to rest on doubtful behaviouristic arguments originating from Quine. The 
behaviouristic view of the evidence is rejected, and a broader and more open-minded 
construal of the available evidence is sketched and defended. It is argued, following 
this reassessment of the available evidence, that Davidson’s methodology should be 
relaxed in the following way. Where the extra evidence is not neutral with regard to 
the contributions of meaning and belief to a speaker’s utterances, the interpreter need 
not employ a Principle of Charity. The interpreter should enlist hypothetical, rather 
than aprioristic, maxims subject to constant empirical tests.
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1. Introduction
Davidson saw the application of a Principle of Charity as unavoidable in interpreting 
the words and thoughts of others.1 Davidson’s view was that if one does not adopt his 
Principle of Charity (henceforth, “Davidson’s Principle of Charity” reads DPOC) 
then interpretation becomes impossible. He saw DPOC as the only means by which to 
disentangle questions of what a speaker means from questions of what a speaker 
believes. According to Davidson, one cannot know the meaning of an utterance 
unless one knows what belief the speaker has expressed in making it, and similarly 
one cannot know what it is a speaker believes without knowing what his utterances 
mean. DPOC is a device for holding the speaker’s beliefs fixed in accord with the 
interpreter’s own responses to the environment and standards of consistency. By 
holding belief fixed the interpreter can begin solving for the meanings of the 
speaker’s utterances. The meanings of a speaker’s utterances are stated in terms of 
their truth-conditions.
These other means consist in the employment of evidence about speakers and their 
environments from the natural sciences; evidence relevant to the attribution of 
meanings and beliefs. Davidson does not afford this evidence a central role in 
interpretation because he has accepted Quine’s behaviouristic construal of the 
evidence relevant to the linguist. To establish the master claim, two sub-claims must 
be established: (1) There is admissible, relevant evidence available about speakers 
which is not utilised in Davidson’s Charitable methodology2, and (2) Such evidence 
can serve the disentanglement with which Davidson was concerned. Quine saw the 
entanglement of meaning and belief as one source of the indeterminacy of translation. 
This thesis is not claiming to fully resolve that source of indeterminacy; indeed, 
Davidson did not see his method as resolving it.3
1 Davidson, 1967, pp.27. Unless otherwise attributed, all quotations are from Davidson.
2 A “Charitable Method” for interpretation is one that employs a Principle of Charity.
3 “No single optimum charity emerges; the constraints therefore determine no single theory. Li a theory 
of radical translation (as Quine calls it) there is no completely disentangling questions of what the alien 
means from questions of what he believes” 1967, pp. 27.
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The claim then is that DPOC is not the only available means to disentangling 
questions of meaning and belief. The employment of knowledge from sciences such 
as psychology, linguistics and optics is entirely relevant to pinning down a speaker’s 
beliefs. Knowledge from empirical linguistics may be relevant to pinning down a 
speaker’s meanings. If we start out assuming nothing and knowing nothing about the 
speaker with which we are presented, we might, for example, learn through empirical 
psychology that he tracks enduring medium-sized objects against contrasting 
backgrounds much as we do. Or we may learn from studying the workings of the 
speaker’s eyes or ears that they function very differently to our own and are 
connected to the speaker’s brain in some peculiar way. This information should be 
carefully handled but is entirely relevant to the discernment of the native’s beliefs. 
The availability of such empirical evidence in an impressive quantity would cast 
doubt on the necessity of DPOC to the disentanglement of belief and meaning that 
must occur in interpretation The claim of this thesis is not the absurd one that i£ for 
example, we know that a speaker’s eyes work much as ours do then we can conclude 
that his perceptual beliefs must be the same as ours. This claim relies on a crude view 
of the relationship between empirical evidence and belief ascriptions. My claim is the 
weaker one that natural evidence about a speaker is relevant to our discernment of a 
speaker’s meanings and beliefs. To take an extreme case, our knowledge that a man is 
blind renders it highly unlikely that he has the same beliefs about the visual 
environment as his sighted interpreter.
Davidson’s Charitable methodology should be revised in the context of a more open- 
minded view of the evidence available to the interpreter. The Principle of 
Correspondence, a constituent of DPOC4, prompts the interpreter to take the speaker 
to be responding to the same features of the world as he would in those 
circumstances. This is not something we need assume but a matter that can be 
illuminated by the sciences. The admission of such evidence does not speak in favour 
of a reduction of the intentional notions to the natural evidence. Supposing that the 
evidence one gathered was described in physical terms, then the reductive claim
4 1983,pp.211.
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would be that the intentional notions could be defined in scrupulously physical terms. 
One can hold that natural evidence is relevant to working out someone’s beliefs, 
without being reductive. On several occasions Davidson himself allows that 
knowledge of the speaker’s sensory apparatus, positioning, background capabilities 
and other facts can be fruitful in interpretation.5 Yet no such concessions are to be 
found in the canonical formulations of DPOC.
Davidson’s behaviouristic view of the evidence is the result of two factors. Firstly, 
there is overwhelming evidence that Davidson accepted Quine’s behaviouristic 
construal of the evidence relevant to the study of language. Not only does Davidson 
acknowledge his own discussion of Radical Interpretation as resembling Quine’s 
discussion of Radical Translation with respect to the mechanics, he accepts a version 
of Quine’s manifestation argument for linguistic behaviourism (see 4.4). Quine’s 
behaviouristic arguments are highly dubious and Davidson’s method suffers for his 
acceptance of them. Secondly, there was a lingering conviction on Davidson’s part 
that his Charitable method by itself was adequate to good interpretation.6 Davidson 
said that the application of DPOC to the behavioural evidence, together with the 
satisfaction of the formal constraints on a theory of meaning, exhaust the constraints 
on interpretatioa8 My thesis is a denial of this point: Davidson does not give us good 
reason to limit the interpreter in this way.
There is a relation between an utterance in observable circumstances and the truth- 
conditions of that utterance such that the utterance constitutes only one piece of 
defeasible evidence amongst several sources of defeasible evidence for the truth- 
conditions. Davidson himself does not instruct the interpreter always to take an 
utterance to be true to the observable circumstances, he counts utterances on
5 2001b, pp.xix. 1974c, pp.282.
6 200 lb, pp.xx. Having accepted Lewis’s injunctions over knowledge of sensory apparatus, bad 
positioning et al, Davidson maintained:
“I do not take this to prove that the evidential base on which I depend is not in theory adequate.”
See also 1974c.
7 As explained in section 2 of this thesis, the formal constraints involve satisfying T arski’s Convention 
T on a theory of truth.
8 1974b, pp. 196-7.
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occasions as defeasible evidence for truth-conditions. The difference between the 
current suggestion and Davidson’s is that he enlists only one source of defeasible 
evidence, namely behaviour, where one should be prepared to admit many. Davidson 
agrees that the relation between an utterance on an occasion and its truth-conditions 
may have no uniform character; there may be factors peculiar to individual cases. But 
his limited view of the defeasible evidence commits his interpreter to finding a high 
degree of truth in the speaker. A belief, call it belief*, is identified on Davidson’s 
view only by its place amongst a surrounding network of beliefs. On this view, too 
much falsity in the surrounding beliefs undermines the purported subject matter of 
belief*. It is plausible that with the employment of more diverse sources of evidence 
in interpreting a speaker, one can begin to discern their beliefs in ways that do not 
require placing those beliefs in a constellation of true belief. In this respect, this thesis 
is not only a challenge to Davidson but also the offer of some moderation of the 
strong epistemological consequences he saw his approach to truth and interpretation 
as having.
The first objective of this thesis is an overview of Davidson’s approach to the 
philosophy of language. The second and most important objective is to give a detailed 
and coherent account of DPOC. A problem with some of the secondary literature is 
that it shows only a weak understanding of DPOC and its place within Davidson’s 
method, and so loses its bite as a critique of Davidsoa My account of DPOC aims to 
do justice to the important refinements and additions Davidson made to a formulation 
he inherited from Quine. The fourth and central section of the thesis presents a 
challenge to Davidson’s pronouncements on the necessity of DPOC to interpretatioa 
Suggestions are made concerning the kind of evidence or knowledge that may be 
employed in effecting the disentanglement of meaning and belief with which 
Davidson was concerned. My claim is that such evidence is afforded at most a 
peripheral role by Davidson and that this marginalisation is unjustified. The thesis 
concludes with some positive sketches of how the employment of further evidence 
might go.
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2. Davidson’s Approach to the Philosophy of Language
This section outlines Davidson’s approach to the philosophy of language up to the 
point at which DPOC enters the picture. Davidson invites us to consider how we 
should go about constructing a theory of meaning for a language. DPOC becomes 
pivotal in his answer to this question. To understand this matter we need to equip 
ourselves with an account of the form that Davidson thought such a theory should 
take, and a sense of why he thought this question so central to the philosophy of 
language.
2.1 What is a Theory of Meaning?
The construction of a theory of meaning is intended to provide an answer to the 
question of how utterances mean what they do. It is, of course, unclear how exactly 
one should take this question. One reason for this lack of clarity is that it is hard to 
give an explanation of the term “mean” in “utterances mean what they do”. Another 
reason for the lack of clarity is that the “how” in “how utterances mean what they do” 
lends itself to a range of approaches. Nonetheless, Davidson proposed that we could 
answer our original question if we knew how to construct a theory that met three 
conditions. We can specify these three conditions, and give the rationale for them, 
before we go on to describe the species of theory that Davidson thought would meet 
them satisfactorily.
Firstly, the theory must state the meaning of every sentence, actual and potential, of 
the language in question.
If sentences depend for their meaning on their structure, and we understand the meaning of 
each item in the structure only as an abstraction from the totality of sentences in which it 
features, then we can give the meaning of any sentence (or word) only by giving the meaning 
of every sentence (or word) in the language.
9 1967, pp.22.
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If a speaker knows the theory then he should understand the language in question; he 
should know what all the sentences of the language mean. Davidson notes that the 
question of ‘what we could know’ that would enable us to understand a speaker of 
some language is not the same as the question of ‘what we do in feet know’ that 
enables us to understand the utterances of others.
For there may easily be something we could know and don’t, knowledge of which would 
suffice for interpretation, while on the other hand it is not altogether obvious that there is 
anything we actually know that plays an essential role in interpretation.10
Furthermore, Davidson’s account of how we could come to know a theory of 
meaning is not intended to be an account of the actual process of first or second 
language acquisition. A theory of meaning is not an empirical theory of language 
learning (although it should fit well with one). His question is thus “a doubly relative 
question: given a theory that would make interpretation possible, what evidence 
plausibly available to a potential interpreter would support the theory to a reasonable 
degree?”11
Secondly, the theory must be confirmable without prior knowledge of the detailed 
propositional attitudes of the speakers of the language:
interpretation12 cannot hope to take as evidence for the meaning of a sentence an account of 
the complex and delicately discriminated intentions with which the sentence is typically
uttered the central difficulty is that we cannot hope to attach a sense to the attribution
of finely discriminated intentions independently of interpreting speech. The reason is not feat 
we cannot ask necessary questions, but feat interpreting an agent’s intentions, his beliefs and
10 1973a, pp. 125.
11 ibid
12 “Interpretation” here meaning fee construction of a theory of meaning for a speaker. Davidson often 
talks of a “theory of interpretation” rather than a “theory of meaning”. One gets fee impression feat fee 
phrases “theory of interpretation” and “theory of meaning” are used interchangeably. But Davidson is 
at pains to point out feat interpretation, coming to understand a speaker, involves not only working out 
fee meaning of his words but also constructing a theory of his beliefs and actions.
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his words are parts of a single project, no part of which can be assumed to be complete before 
the rest is.13
Thirdly, the theory must identify a finite basic vocabulary of the language from which 
we can explain the meaning of a potential infinity of sentences. A language with 
infinite basic vocabulary would not be learnable by creatures of finite powers.
2.2 Davidson and Tarski
With these three conditions in mind, Davidson argued that a theory of truth, in the 
form of a Tarskian definition of truth for a formal language, could serve as a theory of 
meaning if adapted so as to apply to natural languages. Tarski sought to give an 
extensional definition of truth for formal languages, or more specifically a definition 
schema that a truth theory for any particular formal language must fit. According to 
Tarski’s Convention T, an acceptable theory of truth should yield a theorem of the 
form:
(T) S is true if and only if p,
for every sentence “S” of the language in question. “S” in this schema is replaced by 
a description of a sentence of the object (or target) language and “p” by the described 
sentence itself where the metalanguage contains the object language, or by its 
translation into the metalanguage where it does not. The notion of translation occurs 
in Convention T: Tarski’s condition of adequacy on a truth definition takes meaning 
(translation) as given when testing a truth definition. The truth definition for each 
formal language constitutes a partial definition of the concept of truth:
It should be emphasised that neither the expression (T) itself (which is not a sentence but only 
a schema of a sentence) nor any particular instance of the form (T) can be regarded as a 
definition of truth. We can only say that every equivalence of the form (T) obtained by 
replacing ‘p’ by a particular sentence and ‘S’ by a name of this sentence, may be considered
13 1973a, p. 127.
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a partial definition of truth, which explains wherein the truth of this one individual sentence 
consists. The general definition has to be, in a certain sense, a logical conjunction of all these 
partial definitions.14
The formalised languages with which Tarski was concerned could be known by their 
syntax. Even if the object language and metalanguage were different, the meanings of 
the terms were still unproblematically available.15 Davidson intended a reversal of the 
dependence of the truth definition on the notion of meaning that was to be found in 
Tarski.
a syntactical test of the truth of a T-sentence would be worthless, since such a test would 
presuppose the understanding of the object language one hopes to gain.16
The meanings of natural language sentences and hence translations between natural 
languages are not unproblematically available; we cannot give the meanings of 
natural language terms by stipulation and the meaning of natural language sentences 
is not given in their syntax. So Davidson took our grasp of the truth predicate rather 
than a notion of translation or meaning to be primitive. Within a theory a primitive 
term is one which we decide to use without giving an explicit definition in other 
terms. He assumed that truth was a concept of which we had a grasp prior to 
constructing a theory of meaning. This is not the place to give a detailed account of 
Davidson’s views on truth but suffice to say, he argued that truth could not be defined
17in more basic terms. Davidson found it plausible that one good sense to be given to 
saying someone understands a declarative sentence is that he knows what it is for it to 
be true.18 Davidson sought to give an analysis of the meaning of the sentences of a 
language by detailing the dependence of their truth-conditions on the sentences’ 
composition. What Davidson required of a truth theory for a natural language was
14 T arski, 1944, pp .71.
15 1974a, pp. 150.
16 ibid
171996,pp.263-278.
18 See 1967.
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that it met Convention T and that it could be confirmed without using the notion of 
meaning or translation.
2.3 Truth theory and Natural Language
To return briefly to the difference between Tarski and Davidson’s projects, Tarski’s 
schema for a truth definition was intended for formalised languages and his test for 
the adequacy was intended as a test for truth theories for formalised languages.
Formalised languages can be roughly characterised as artificially constructed languages in
19which the sense of every expression is uniquely determined by its form.
Tarski was prepared to call languages formal if they fulfilled the following criteria: 
(1) The full vocabulary of the language is available, (2) The syntactic rules are 
precisely formulated, (3) The syntactic rules refer only to the form of an expression 
(4) The function and meaning of an expression depend only on its form. Tarski 
thought that his truth definition applied only to formalised rather than natural 
languages for two reasons.
Tarski’s first reason was that “the universal character of natural languages leads to 
contradiction (the semantic paradoxes)”.20 The “universal character” of natural 
language refers to the lack of restrictions on the sentences we allow to be formed in 
natural language. The quantifiers of natural language have a broad range of values in 
the following sense. We allow the quantifiers of natural language to range over 
sentences of natural language themselves and can derive paradoxes from this feature 
of natural language. We can form, for example, the sentence “This sentence is false” 
which is true if and only if it is false. Davidson, unlike Tarski, took the fact that such 
paradoxes arise as a reason to be suspicious that natural languages are universal in 
this way.
19 Tarski, 1935, sect. 2.
20 1967,pp.28.
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Tarski’s second reason for thinking that his work on truth did not apply to natural 
languages was that “natural languages are too confused and amorphous to permit the 
direct application of formal methods”.21 Tarski thought we would have to reform 
natural language out of all recognition before we could apply his definition to them 
Davidson saw that:
If this is true it is fatal to my project, for the task as I conceive it is not to change, improve, or
22reform a language, but to describe and understand it
Davidson was more optimistic than Tarski about the application of formal methods to 
natural language. The following remarks illustrate Davidson’s hopes that the 
ambiguity and amorphousness of natural language are not prohibitive:
As long as the ambiguity does not affect grammatical form, and can be translated, ambiguity
23for ambiguity, into the metalanguage, a truth definition will not tell us any lies.
To give an example: suppose success in giving the truth conditions for some significant range
of sentences in the active voice. Then with a formal procedure for transforming each such
sentence into a corresponding sentence in the passive voice, the theory of truth could be
24extended in an obvious way to this new set of sentences.
Davidson thought his suggestion paved the way for a “serious semantics of natural 
language, for it is likely that, many outstanding puzzles, such as the analysis of 
quotations or sentences about propositional attitudes, can be solved if we recognise a 
concealed demonstrative construction”.25 It is important to recognise the challenge 
that Davidson saw here because without the prospect of resolution to these problems 
his claim that a Tarskian truth theory could serve as a theory of meaning would begin 
to look implausible. It is not a goal of this paper to assess the prescience or 
plausibility of these claims about the possible regimentation of natural language.
21 ibid
22 1967,pp.29.
23 1967,pp.30.
24 ibid
^ 1961, ^ 3 5 .
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2.4 Satisfying the Conditions on a Theory of Meaning
Davidson’s idea then was that a truth definition adapted to natural language, which 
satisfied Convention T and fitted all the empirical evidence could serve as a theory of 
meaning for that language. Let us look back at our three conditions on a theory of 
meaning. Our first condition was that the theory states the meaning of every sentence
of the language in questioa If we accept a very close relation between knowing the
26truth-conditions of an assertoric sentence and knowing what that sentence means 
then this condition is met. Convention T ensures that a theorem stating the truth- 
conditions of every sentence of the language in question will be given in an adequate 
theory of truth:
the definition works by giving necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of every 
sentence, and to give truth conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence. To know 
the semantic concept of truth for a language is to know what it is for a sentence -  any 
sentence -  to be true, and this amounts, in one good sense we can give to the phrase, to 
understanding the language 27
Within such a theory of truth it is possible to prove from a finite set of axioms and a 
set of procedural rules, a theorem, for each sentence of the language, that states the 
truth conditions of that sentence. The recursiveness of a Tarskian truth theory seems 
to ensure that the third condition on a satisfactory theory of meaning is fulfilled. The 
proof of each theorem from the axioms shows how the truth or falsity of the sentence 
depends on its composition from finite vocabulary. The compositionality of the 
theory is one way in which it answers the question of how words mean what they 
do28. The procedural rules tell us how theorems can be constructed from the axioms;
26 In the discussion of Foster’s problem that follows we are looking at one way in which a sentence’s 
truth-conditions and a sentence’s meaning seem to come apart. This is then a challenge to the idea that 
a correct Tarskian truth definition will state the meaning of every sentence o f a language.
27 1967,pp.24.
28 The other way in which it provides an answer to the question of how utterances mean what they do 
concerns the theory’s fulfilment of the second condition. In specifying the evidence from which we 
could come to know what the utterances of a language mean we are saying something about how those
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once we have some axioms stating the semantically relevant features of sentence 
constituents we can generate indefinitely many T-sentences by applying minimal 
logical machinery. The logical machinery that Davidson originally had in mind was 
just first-order quantificational logic but he later wavered on this point:
My working assumption has been that nothing more than first-order quantification theory is 
available. Indeed, I was long convinced that many alternative approaches to semantics, 
employing for example, modal logics, possible world semantics, or substitutional 
quantification, could not be accommodated in a theory that met the demands of Convention T. 
I now know this was hasty. Convention T does not settle as much as I thought, and more 
possibilities for interesting theorizing are open than I had realized. The well known virtues of 
quantification theory still provide plenty of motivation, however, to see how much we can do 
with it29
Davidson thought that the axioms of a truth theory must be finite in number if the 
theory is to give us insight into the structure of the language and how the meaning of 
a sentence depends on its parts.30 He may have been wrong. One needs only a finite 
number of axiom schemas, not a finite number of axioms for such insight. One needs 
only the axiom schemas such as “x denotes y” or “x is satisfied if and only if y” to be 
enumerable for insight into the structure of the language, not for there to be a finite 
number of axioms such as “‘Gareth’ denotes Gareth”. His point that a language is 
only learnable if the basic vocabulary stated in the axioms is finite would still stand.
If one were constructing a theory for a formal language one could stipulate the 
conditions under which the sentences of that language are true. Sentences of natural 
languages, however, already have truth-conditions. So a question can be framed about 
what those truth-conditions are and which sentence of one natural language has the 
same truth-conditions as a certain sentence of another. How do we know when we 
have framed a T-sentence in which p states the truth conditions of s? To get clear on
utterances can be meaningful to the interpreter. Davidson’s way of meeting this second condition is the 
focus of this thesis. It is in relation to this condition that we are introduced to DPOC.
29 2001b, pp.xvii.
30 See 1965.
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the kind of objectively available evidence that could confirm or disconfirm a T- 
sentence, Davidson suggests, following Quine’s discussion of Radical Translation in 
Word and Object, that we think about the radical case in which we encounter a 
language that is entirely unfamiliar to us and spoken by people about whom we know 
nothing. Davidson assumes that the language in which the theory is couched is one 
that we understand. In Davidson’s scenario we get interpretations rather than 
translations, with “is true” occurring on only the left hand side of the bi-conditional. 
The reference to a language we understand becomes unnecessary, Davidson 
suggested, when we view an overall theory of interpretation as a compound of “a 
structurally revealing theory of interpretation for a known language, and a system of 
translation from the unknown language into the known.”31
On Davidson’s approach the evidence available to the interpreter in the radical 
situation consists in only the sounds he hears uttered, what he sees the speakers do 
and the observable circumstances. It is a little misleading to attribute this view to 
Davidson unreservedly. It is unclear whether he wanted to delimit the relevant 
evidence quite so narrowly, even in the radical case. For example, Davidson mentions 
in connection with the evidence relevant to interpretation “simplicity, hunches about 
the effects of social conditioning, and of course our common sense, or scientific 
knowledge of explicable error”.32 He also says that “interpretation must take into 
account probable errors due to bad positioning, deficient sensory apparatus, and 
differences in background knowledge”33. On the other hand, in answering the 
question of whether a theory of truth can be verified by appeal to evidence available 
before interpretation has begun, Davidson says:
the relevant evidence can consist entirely of facts about the behaviour and attitudes of
speakers in relation to sentences (no doubt by way of utterances).34
31 1973a, pp. 130.
32 1974b, pp. 196.
33 2001b
34 1973a, pp.133.
16
What is clear is that Davidson claimed that an interpreter cannot start out by making 
use of the intentions that accompany speech because discerning these intentions relies 
on and is part of working out what has been said:
radical interpretation cannot hope to take as evidence for the meaning of a sentence an 
account of the complex and delicately discriminated intentions with which the sentence is
typically uttered..............the central difficulty is that we cannot hope to attach a sense to the
attribution of finely discriminated intentions independently of interpreting speech. The reason 
is not that we cannot ask necessary questions, but that interpreting an agent’s intentions, his
beliefs and his words are parts of a single project, no part of which can be assumed to be
35complete before the rest is.
2.5 Foster’s Problem, Compositionality, Law-likeness and the Interdependence 
of Meaning and Belief
There is a well-known problem for Davidson’s approach, originally presented by 
Foster, concerning whether or not the theorems of his theory are interpretive. If 
Foster’s problem cannot be given a credible answer then we cannot be satisfied that 
Davidson’s theory will fulfil his first condition on a theory of meaning for a language; 
namely, that it state the meaning of every sentence of the language in questioa This 
problem is discussed here, not in order to provide a fully explicit and convincing 
resolution to Foster’s problem, or to claim that one can be found in Davidson’s 
writings. Rather, we turn to it because Davidson’s reaction to the problem is 
illuminating of his method and the way in which he viewed the theorems of an 
interpretive truth theory.
Foster’s problem involves the possibility of correct but non-interpretive theorems. 
The truth of the bi-conditional requires only that the sentences on either side have the 
same truth value. So, how can we exclude from our theory theorems such as:
“Snow is white” is true if and only if grass is green
35 1973a, pp.127.
17
In which the sentences to the left and right of the bi-conditional share truth-value but
s '
the theorem would not, if known, allow one to understand the object sentence? In 
such an example, only the formal restrictions on a theory of meaning are in place. An 
interpretive truth theory would also have to fit the empirical evidence given by a 
speaker’s use of the language in observable circumstances. A true theorem of a theory 
of meaning must at least be implied by a recursive theory of truth that fits all of the 
evidence. The description of interpretation we are given by Davidson is of a 
process. We may be able to get our speakers talking on the subject matter of these bi­
conditionals, and in doing so eliminate some of the alternatives on the basis of new 
evidence. We exchange one theory of truth for another -  always treating our theory as 
a work in progress.
The theorem for each sentence of the object language must be derivable from a finite 
number of axioms. A theory in which we could derive the theorem:
“Snow is white” is true if and only if grass is green
would include amongst it axioms:
“Snow” denotes grass.
This would entail that within our theory we could derive the false theorem:
“Snow is falling” is true if and only if grass is falling.
Furthermore, Davidson37 came to think that if a theory of truth were to explain how 
utterances meant what they did it would not be sufficient for the theory to be true. 
Firstly, its axioms and theorems must be law-like. Davidson saw that this was a
36 1973 a
37 1976
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concession to intensionality38 within what had been intended as an extensional theory. 
How much of a concession this was, he argued, depends on one’s analysis of a law. 
One must concede, however, that the notion of a law is one drawn on in all the 
empirical sciences. Secondly, someone in possession of the truth theory could only 
understand a speaker of the object language, could only know what they meant, if 
they knew that the theorems of the theory were law-like. This second requirement 
may be excessive. It amounts to the requirement that the interpreter needs not only to 
know what the speaker’s utterance means, he also needs to be aware that what he has 
is knowledge. An alternative response to this requirement, one defended by Larson 
and Segal39, is that we are disposed to treat a correct truth theory as interpretive. They 
claim that if one came to possess an interpretive theory then “the knowledge gap, 
though present, would be irrelevant to understanding or action, since speakers would 
proceed as if they already knew that their truth theories were interpretive.”40
There may be harder instances of Foster’s problem for the truth-theoretic approach 
that are not dealt with by the compositionality or law-likeness of the theorems. One 
such case involves counterfeit theorems into which have been substituted co- 
referential terms that differ in sense.41 How could we distinguish the interpretive:
“Hesperus is bright” is true if and only if Hesperus is bright
From the non-interpretive “‘Hesperus is bright” is true if and only if Phosphorus is 
bright’? Since Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical it doesn’t seem that we can 
appeal to the law-likeness of the theorems to explain why one is interpretive and the 
other not so. The compositionality of the theory won’t serve to distinguish them 
either: as “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” have the same reference we would not get 
false theorems involving sentences in which “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” occur.
38 Laws seem to form an intensional context, a context in which the substitution of expressions with the 
same semantic value need not preserve the semantic value (truth-value) of the original sentence.
39 Larson, R. and Segal, G., 1995.
40 Larson, R. and Segal, G., 1995, pp.39.
41 Assuming we find talk of terms having a sense and a referent cogent.
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There may be a way to distinguish the interpretive truth theory from the counterfeit 
available within the truth theoretic approach described by Davidsoa The other half of 
constructing a theory of meaning for a speaker, of interpreting a speaker, is ascribing 
beliefs to the speaker. According to the interpretive theorem the speaker’s utterance 
“Hesperus is bright” provides evidence that he believes that Hesperus is bright and 
according to the counterfeit it is evidence for a belief that Phosphorus is bright. But if 
we assign our speaker the belief that Phosphorus is bright then shouldn’t we predict 
that he’ll hold true the sentence “Phosphorus is bright”? If he doesn’t know that 
Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical then he may not hold this sentence true and 
this would serve to distinguish the theory containing the interpretive theorem from the 
one containing the counterfeit theorem. Only the interpretive theorem sustains the 
result that one can understand the language without knowing that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus.
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3. Davidson’s Principle of Charity
3.1 The Origins of DPOC
DPOC is a methodological rule for constructing a theory of meaning for a speaker of 
some language with which we are unfamiliar. Before giving an account of the content 
of DPOC, the status of the principle within Davidson’s account should be remarked 
upon. He saw DPOC as “unavoidable”42, “forced on us”43, “not an option but a 
condition of a workable theory” 44 He was uncompromising on the necessity of 
DPOC for interpretation. In light of this status, Davidson was prepared to say that “it 
is meaningless to suggest that we could fell into error by endorsing it”.45 Davidson 
saw the adoption of DPOC as the only way in which to solve the interpreter’s 
problem of disentangling questions of what a speaker means from questions of what 
he believes. To see how questions of meaning and belief are entangled consider an 
example. On hearing the unfamiliar utterance “Gavagai” in the presence of a rabbit, 
we could attribute the speaker the belief that there is a rabbit present and translate the 
utterance as “There is a rabbit present”. But on the ascription of a different belief, 
perhaps about rabbit parts rather than rabbits, we should translate his utterance as 
expressing something different, perhaps “there is an undetached rabbit part”. How we 
interpret a speaker’s words will depend on what belief we take him to be expressing 
and similarly, which beliefs we think he is expressing will depend on how we 
interpret his words. DPOC serves to “rule out a priori massive error on the part of the 
speaker”46 and in doing so, fixes, to some degree, the beliefs of the speaker to be 
interpreted. Davidson believed that this was the only feasible way to go about a 
“systematic correlation of sentences held true with sentences held true”47. Prior to 
pairing up the speaker’s sentences with sentences of one’s own language it makes no
42 1967,pp.27.
43 1974b, pp. 197.
44 ibid
45 ibid
46 1975, pp. 168-9.
47 1974b, pp. 197.
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sense to talk of a speaker as making a mistaken assertion because one cannot say in 
one’s own language over what it is that the speaker is mistaken.
A noteworthy feature of DPOC is the considerable development that it underwent 
between 1967 and 1991 and this is brought out in the account that follows. On its 
appearance in 1967, DPOC looked a lot like Quine’s principle; involving the 
maximisation of agreement and also consistency. But it ended up as something quite 
different; richer but also intriguing in terms of what it might involve. By 198448 
Davidson claimed to find the notion of maximising over beliefs, and particularly 
maximising agreement over beliefs, to be an unfortunate one. He professed that his 
goal had always been intelligibility rather than agreement. The notion of agreement 
dropped out of the formulation of DPOC by 1991 to be replaced by the notion of 
shared responses to the external world.
Davidson originally saw himself as applying “across the board”49 a Principle of 
Charity (henceforth, any Principle of Charity that is not Davidson’s reads POC) 
similar to that which Quine had applied to the observation sentences and logical 
connectives in his account of Radical Translation (see 4.4 for discussion of Quine’s 
views on translation). Quine’s maxim of translation had been that:
assertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of
language.50
The plausibility of the maxim resided in the translator thinking absurdity in the 
speaker less probable than his having made a bad translation. In constructing 
analytical hypotheses Quine warns us that “the more absurd or exotic the beliefs 
imputed to a people, the more suspicious we are entitled to be of the translations”.51 
This amounts to finding agreement on the obvious which for Quine included
48 2001b, pp.xvii-xix.
49 1973a, pp.136n.
50 Quine, 1960, ch.2 Sect. 13.
51 Quine, 1960, ch.2 Sect. 15.
22
observation sentences and logical truths. Quine thought observation sentences were 
uncontaminated by theory because they are directly conditioned to sensory 
stimulation.
Davidson did not see how to draw a strict line between observational and theoretical 
sentences and so “had less choice” about the sentences to which DPOC was to be 
applied. Rather, he did not think there was any particular class of sentences to which 
its application should be restricted. Quine’s distinction between observational and 
theoretical sentences turned on the notion of “stimulus meaning”. The stimulus 
meaning of a sentence is a pairing of its affirmative and negative stimulus meaning. 
The affirmative stimulus meaning consists in all those patterns of sensory stimulation 
that cause assent to the sentence and the negative stimulus meaning all those that 
cause dissent. Quine thought there was an important distinction between the 
observation sentences, whose significance is determined by their direct conditioning 
to sensory stimulation, and the more theoretical sentences. The distinction implies 
that belief in an observation sentence could be justified extra-linguistically by appeal 
to sensory stimulation: that there can be a direct comparison of language and the 
world. Davidson did not accept the significance of the distinction because he found he 
could not make sense of the idea that sensory stimulation could justify a belief even a 
belief of which the stimulation in question is the cause.53 Davidson held that only 
beliefs can justify a further belief.54 More broadly, he claimed he could not make any 
sense of the idea of direct confrontation between language and un-interpreted world 
and recognising this point can serve to allay a misunderstanding. The application of 
DPOC which Davidson envisages is not a two part process. There is not a first 
application of DPOC to observational beliefs followed by a second application to the 
rest. All the ascribed beliefs get the character they have from their place amongst a 
host of beliefs discerned using DPOC.55
52 1983, pp. 151.
53 See 1983.
54 See 1983.
55 Smith, Unpublished.
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DPOC, as presented in 196756, instructed the interpreter to (1) maximise agreement 
with the speaker to be interpreted and (2) to maximise the self-consistency of the 
speaker.57 Davidson saw the first instruction as crucial to our understanding what the 
speaker is talking about: throughout his writings he claims that we cannot attribute a 
speaker too much erroneous belief because it will leave nothing for them to be in 
error about. Davidson saw the second instruction as crucial to our understanding the 
speaker.
Crediting people with a large degree of consistency cannot be counted mere charity: it is 
unavoidable if we are to be in a position to accuse than meaningfully of error and some 
degree of irrationality. Global confusion, like universal mistake, is unthinkable, not because 
imagination boggles, but because too much confusion leaves nothing to be confused about 
and massive error erodes the background of true belief against which alone failure can be 
construed.58
Both of the instructions for understanding a speaker must be understood in connection 
to Davidson’s views on the interdependence of the content of beliefs. Davidson 
thought that to attribute one belief involved attributing many other beliefs:
A belief is identified by its location in a pattern of beliefs; it is their pattern that determines 
the subject matter of the belief, what the belief is about. Before some object in, or some aspect 
o f die world can become part of the subject matter of a belief (true or false) there must be 
endless true beliefs about that subject matter. False beliefs tend to undermine the 
identification of the subject matter; to undermine, therefore, the validity of the description of 
the belief as being about that subject. And so, in turn, false beliefs undermine the claim that a 
connected belief is false.59
The case-by-case applications of DPOC ramify throughout the holistically attributed 
set of beliefs. The strength of Davidson’s holism about belief attribution should not 
go unmentioned. It is a contentious claim that one needs to have endless true beliefs
56 It is worth dating and considering the development of DPOC.
57 1967,pp.27
58 1970b, p.221
59 1975, pp. 168-9
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about some subject matter for it to figure in one’s beliefe. A less contentious way of 
putting Davidson’s holism about belief attribution is to say that for an interpreter to 
attribute a speaker an incredible belief it must have some place within the overall 
interpretation of the speaker. This latter formulation may not take the interpreter as 
far as attributing the speaker endless true beliefs about the subject matter. On either 
way of making the point, to attribute a false belief the interpreter must have well 
confirmed hypotheses about the meaning of the relevant utterances but find no place 
for the corresponding belief amongst his own pattern of beliefs.
Davidson gave the following example of a belief seeming to have a certain subject 
matter but the purported subject matter being obscured by related false beliefs. 
Centuries ago some people believed that the Earth was flat. One can interpret their 
belief as about the same earth that we have in mind because they share a sufficient 
degree of mundane belief about the Earth with us. Davidson ventures that if we 
construe these people as wrong in a sufficient number of their related beliefs, it 
becomes questionable whether or not they did in fact believe that the Earth, the same 
Earth which we have in mind, was flat. The possibility of identifying their belief as 
about the Earth rests on attributing them a background of “largely unmentioned and 
unquestioned true beliefs” 60 such as the beliefs that we live on the earth and that the 
face of the Earth is covered by land and water.
Davidson thought that as DPOC contained two instructions, labeled (1) and (2) above, 
it would determine no single theory of meaning for a speaker:
No single principle of optimum charity emerges; the constraints therefore determine no single
theory 61
This lack of complete determination stems in part from there being:
60 1975, pp. 168
61 1967,pp.27
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no completely disentangling questions of what the alien means from questions of what he 
believes.62
The interplay of the two instructions is another block on complete determinacy 
because our finding a particular belief of the speaker’s in agreement with our own 
may compromise the speaker’s overall consistency and vice-versa. So there may be a 
choice between two equally acceptable theories of meaning: one of which settled on 
more agreement and compromised consistency and the other on less agreement and 
more consistency.
3.2 Coherence and Correspondence
63By 1991 DPOC was explicitly split into two components: a Principle of Coherence 
and a Principle of Correspondence (henceforth, POCoh and POCor):
The Principle of Coherence prompts the interpreter to discover a degree of logical consistency 
in the thought of the speaker, The Principle of Correspondence prompts the interpreter to take 
the speaker to be responding to the same features of the world that he (the interpreter) would 
be responding to under similar circumstances. Both principles can be (and have been) called 
Principles of Charity: one principle endows the speaker with a modicum of logic, the other 
endows him with a degree o f what the interpreter takes to be true belief about the world.
It is worth considering why Davidson could not make do with only one of these 
principles. POCoh is by itself insufficient for effecting the disentanglement of belief 
and meaning because at the outset the interpreter doesn’t have a scheme of beliefs for 
the speaker on which to impose a degree of consistency. It will also be the case that 
there are many competing sets of consistent beliefs and so finding consistency alone 
would be inadequate. Neither will POCor suffice; if we attributed speakers a host of 
beliefs in accord with POCor but littered with inconsistencies, then their beliefs 
would come to imply any further beliefs because anything follows from inconsistent
62 ibid
63 1991,pp.211
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premises.64 We would struggle to establish that a speaker’s beliefs concerned had any 
particular subject matter given enough inconsistency on his part. So the dual aspects 
of DPOC are mutually reinforcing. Notice that in this dual aspect formulation of 
DPOC talk of maximizing agreement has disappeared to be replaced by the notion of 
responding to shared aspects of the environment. This shift is the focus of section 3.3. 
Davidson’s talk of speaker and interpreter responding to the same aspects of the 
world does not afford perceptual beliefs a special status in his account. All beliefs 
need to be set in the context of other beliefs to be made sense of. What he is 
interested in is the importance of occasion sentences in beginning interpretatioa 
Occasion sentences are those whose causes of assent and dissent come and go as 
circumstances change. So these sentences can be paired with observable 
circumstances when stating their truth-conditions.
There are on any given occasion many aspects of the observable circumstances that 
an interpreter might respond to. The question of which aspects of the observable 
circumstances are relevant to the speaker is answerable only against the background 
of a developing theory of the speaker’s beliefs. The interpreter takes the speaker to be 
responding to the features he would respond to and there is obviously some notion of 
salience involved here. But the interpreter need not circumscribe these features too 
narrowly at the outset. He may start with a quite general statement of the observable 
circumstances involving many conjuncts. The interpreter progresses by narrowing 
down and revising the statement of truth-conditions that appear on the right hand side 
of the T-sentence.
The idea that the speaker is “responding to” his environment calls for clarification. 
When one says in this context that a speaker is responding to features of his 
environment, what is it that the speaker is doing? At the very least we are claiming 
some causal relationship between our speaker and his environment; that some aspect
64 Clearly it is not the case that the inconsistencies exhibited in most people’s belief sets mean that 
their beliefs imply any further beliefs. This should be explained by thinking of people’s belief sets as 
divided into subsets, and of normal people as having some inconsistent subsets but many consistent 
subsets.
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of his environment is causing a piece of verbal behaviour. It may turn out that in 
some cases all we can say is that a speaker’s verbal behaviour is caused by his 
interaction with his environment: the speaker may not be interpretable as expressing 
beliefs about his environment. In this minimal sense, a monkey “responds to” his 
environment. Monkeys are caused to make certain distinguishable sounds in response 
to different aggressors. Yet one might not want to attribute to a monkey a range of 
beliefs about his environment because a monkey cannot apply the concepts necessary 
for the possession of beliefs. The idea of an interpretable speaker responding to his 
environment, his having a collection of beliefs and expressing them, involves more 
than mere causal interactioa It involves the speaker’s thoughts being directed at some 
aspect of the environment with which he is in causal interaction: his finding some 
aspect of the environment, with which he interacts, salient. For Davidson, a speaker’s 
possessing beliefs also requires his having a notion of objectivity; his grasping the 
distinction between something’s being believed and its being the case.
One also needs to clarify what is involved in the interpreter and speaker responding to 
the same aspect of the environment. It does not mean that the interpreter cannot find 
the speaker to have beliefs incompatible with his own. Both may be responding to the 
same object or event by judge something different of it. But the POCor entails that the 
interpreter finds the speaker to have many beliefs in accord with his own on pain of 
undermining the assumption that the speaker is responding to a particular feature of 
the environment, an object or event say, and that it is the very same feature that the 
interpreter is responding to.
In understanding POCoh, one needs to work out what Davidson had in mind 
regarding “a degree of logical consistency” in such statements as:
Needless to say, there are degrees of logical and other consistency, and perfect consistency, 
and perfect consistency is not to be expected. What needs emphasis is only the 
methodological necessity for finding consistency enough.65
65 1983, pp. 150
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One does not usually think of logical consistency as admitting of degrees. A set of 
sentences is normally said to be logically consistent or logically inconsistent not more 
consistent or less consistent. Yet Davidson clearly states that “Coherence is nothing 
but consistency.”66 Davidson needs to be careful because, just as a logically 
inconsistent set of premises implies any conclusion, a logically inconsistent set of 
beliefs will imply any further beliefs. One thing Davidson could mean is that the 
more coherent believer, the more logically consistent speaker, has more consistent 
subsets of beliefs. This would involve our isolating sets of beliefs, perhaps by context 
or time, and examining their consistency individually. The degree of consistency 
would then be the proportion of consistent sets amongst a speaker’s sets of beliefs.
Another element of the dual statement of DPOC above that it is crucial to elaborate 
on is the term “endows”, and the distinction between what is endowed by DPOC and 
what DPOC is. That which is endowed by DPOC is a consequence of its application 
not a part of the content of DPOC. When Davidson says that POCor endows a 
speaker with a degree of true belief) one might mistakenly take Davidson to mean that 
beliefs being largely true, or generally true, is part of the very nature of belief. Some 
commentators have read Davidson as saying that we cannot make any sense of 
someone’s having beliefs if we do not first recognize that veracity is in the nature of 
belief and there must be a preponderance of true belief in any speaker’s belief set. 
This way of reading Davidson gets things the wrong way around. It is from an 
investigation of the conditions that make interpretation possible that Davidson 
derived the conclusion that there has to be “a large degree of truth and consistency in 
the thought and speech of an agent.”67 He thought DPOC necessary to interpretation 
and that which is endowed by applying DPOC is a product of interpretation:
It is an artifact of the interpreter’s correct interpretation of a person’s speech and attitudes that
68there is a large degree of truth and consistency in the thought and speech of an agent
66 1987b, pp. 155.
67 1983, pp. 150.
68 1983, pp. 150. The point is owed to Smith, Unpublished
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It is not the instruction of DPOC that we must find a speaker’s beliefs to be largely 
true. DPOC does not contain any general conclusions about interpretable agents. 
DPOC is a methodological instruction applied case-by-case in giving us new 
interpretations; it is a procedural rule and does not involve any general claims about 
the nature of belief or believing agents.69
3.3 The Move from Maximizing Agreement to Optimizing Intelligibility
Davidson became aware that his earlier talk of “maximizing agreement” could not be 
taken literally because the possible sentences to be construed are infinite in number, 
and no sense can be given to maximizing over infinities. Moreover, as the theory 
begins to take shape -  as we accumulate more well-confirmed T-sentences -  it makes 
sense for the interpreter to entertain error and allow for more or less likely mistakes.70 
Davidson came to think that:
there is no useful way to count beliefs, and so no clear meaning to the idea that most of a 
71person’s beliefs are true.
Therefore, talk of maximizing agreement could only be taken as a hint at how the 
interpreter proceeds. Neither can the interpreter’s instruction be expressed in terms of 
a general presumption in favour of the truth of the speaker's beliefs. This presumption 
would be compatible with each individual belief that we attribute to an interpretable 
speaker turning out to be false, and it is precisely this which Davidson denies is 
possible (see 3.7).72
Davidson decided that rather than “maximize”, “a better word might be optimize” .73In 
optimizing rather than maximizing the agreement one finds with a speaker one might
69 ibid
70 1973a, pp. 136.
71 1983, pp. 138-9.
72 This point is owed to McNeill, 2004.
73 2001b, pp.xix.
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think, for example, that speakers are unlikely to be mistaken about their own feelings 
and very likely mistaken on questions of highly theoretical physics. Similarly, one 
might think speakers more likely to be mistaken in their perceptual beliefs when the 
weather is foggy. Optimizing agreement involves the interpreter making sense of 
explicable error, and also explicable successes.
Charity prompts the interpreter to maximise the intelligibility of the speaker, not sameness of 
belief. This entails, as Lewis says, that interpretation must take into account probable errors 
due to bad positioning, deficient sensory apparatus, and differences in background 
knowledge.74
Davidson’s views on how we go about making sense of error are a matter returned to 
in sections four and five.
In 1984 Davidson wrote:
the Principle of Charity ..... counsels us quite generally to prefer theories of meaning that
minimize disagreement. So I used to put the matter in the early essays, wanting to stress the 
inevitability of the appeal to charity. But minimizing disagreement, or maximizing agreement,
is a confused ideal  My point has always been that understanding can be secured only
by interpreting in a way that makes for the right kind of agreement. The “right sort”, however, 
is no easier to specify than to say what constitutes a good reason for holding a particular 
belief.75
Davidson thought the kind of agreement (and also disagreement) that the principle 
counseled us to find between speaker and interpreter was sensitive to both the context 
and nature of belief in question and hence, nothing more general could be said about 
“the right sort” of agreement.
74 ibid
75 :u ; a
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DPOC does not prompt the interpreter to find sameness of belief but rather “prompts 
the interpreter to maximize the intelligibility of the speaker”.76 It is interesting to 
consider what “making intelligible” could involve. What Davidson seems to have 
meant by “making intelligible” is making beliefs and utterances explicable. The 
project of making a speaker’s beliefs and utterances explicable could give Davidson’s 
account a far wider remit, because a wide variety of information might be relevant to 
making someone’s beliefs explicable. Quine’s employment of a POC was not directed 
at making speakers more explicable. Quine’s POC involved maximizing agreement 
on observation sentences and reading our logic into the speaker’s language. It was 
probably this notion that Davidson himself first had in mind. But if Davidson no 
longer had Quine’s POC in mind, as talk of making people intelligible and explicable 
would suggest, then this raises questions about what Davidson’s account of 
interpretation might involve. More specifically, talk of maximizing, or rather 
optimizing, intelligibility could place interpretation in the setting of the wider 
empirical investigations of psychology, linguistics, optics and other disciplines. 
Empirical psychology has much to say on the matter of making people’s errors and 
successes explicable, and making their beliefs intelligible. Empirical linguistics has 
much to say with regard to explaining how people come to speak the language that 
they do. The employment of these sources of information in making a speaker’s 
beliefs and utterances intelligible might make room for a lot more difference in belief 
between speaker and interpreter. If, for argument’s sake, our speaker was in 
possession of peculiar sensory apparatus, it may take serious empirical work for the 
interpreter to be in a position to make the speaker’s beliefs intelligible.
Davidson, as quoted above, was concerned to make room for Lewis’ injunction that 
interpretation be sensitive to such factors as “probable errors due to bad positioning, 
deficient sensory apparatus, and differences in background knowledge”.77 Davidson 
was concerned with these factors in connection with making a speaker explicable. It 
is an interesting question (see 4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 5) whether knowledge concerning the
76 ibid
77 200 la, pp.xix.
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factors Lewis mentions and related factors might be relevant to making good the 
assumption that the speaker is responding to the same aspects of the world as their 
interpreter. Davidson, however, equivocates over whether the employment of such 
knowledge is part of good interpretation. Shortly after his concession to Lewis, he 
says:
I do not take this to prove that the evidential base on which I depend is not in theory adequate.
78I grant, however, that it may not be.
3.4 Assertion: The Very General Attitude of Holding True
How we construe a speaker’s words will depend on what we take him to believe. 
DPOC can disentangle the question of what a speaker’s words mean from the 
question of what he believes by holding belief fixed (see 3.5). Davidson’s view is that 
the knowledge relevant to ascribing beliefs can come only with the interpretation of 
someone’s words79:
If all we know is what sentences a speaker holds true, and we cannot assume that his language 
is our own, then we cannot take even a first step towards interpretation without knowing or 
assuming a great deal about the speaker’s beliefs. Since knowledge of beliefs comes only with 
the ability to interpret words, the only possibility at the start is to assume general agreement in 
beliefs.80
Davidson’s idea was that prior to understanding a speaker’s utterances and prior to 
knowing what he believes, we can nevertheless identify the sentences that a speaker 
holds true:
A good place to begin is with the very general attitude of holding a sentence true.... It is an 
attitude an interpreter may plausibly be taken to be able to identify before he can interpret,
78 2001 a, pp.xx.
791 try to put Davidson’s claim that the knowledge relevant to discerning someone’s beliefs comes 
only with interpreting their words under pressure (see 4 .1 ,4 .4 ,4 .5 ,5).
80 1974b, pp. 196-7.
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since he may know that a person intends to express a truth in uttering a sentence without 
having any idea what truth.81
One then has a list of sentences held true by a speaker but we know neither what 
beliefs the sentences express nor what the sentences mean. Despite what Davidson 
says in the quotation above, one does not know that a speaker is holding sentences 
true. One assumes that one is observing assertion, the very general attitude of holding 
true. Davidson does not furnish the interpreter with a method by which to know, in 
the radical case, that one is observing speakers holding sentences true.
Davidson may have been relying on the method described by Quine.82 Quine thought 
that to find out the expression of assent in some unfamiliar speaker one should echo 
the speaker’s utterances back at them in unchanging circumstances. The native may 
have two such short words as our “yes” and “no”, of course it is conceivable that they 
do not. One would expect to be answered by their word for “yes” when the 
observable circumstances seemed unchanging to us. But even if the native does have 
two such words which they use at the times when we would use “yes” and “no”, one 
cannot assume that the two words mean precisely the same as ours do. Quine’s 
method then involves the assumptions that the native’s have two short words for 
assent and dissent, and that natives will assent and dissent to their own sentences 
repeated back to them Quine thought that one could spot the equivalent behaviour in 
advance of translating the speaker’s words. Some sentences may be too complex to 
allow for the uncomplicated responses Quine relied oa Sometimes an asserted 
sentence is met with no clear assent or dissent on its being queried. Davidson’s 
assumption that we are observing assertions is more risky than Quine’s claim to be 
able to isolate signs of assent and dissent. Quine is seeking out only two forms of 
expression but assertion can take a whole host of forms and each particular assertion 
is a different expressioa It seems that prior to working out what a speaker believes 
and what his words mean (and getting a grip on the force of his utterances) then there 
is always room for doubt about whether we are observing assertioa Establishing
81 1973a, pp.l 35.
82 Quine, 1960, ch.2.
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whether some creature is performing linguistic actions at all might involve us in 
learning something about, or making assumptions about, their psychology and 
Davidson would agree on this point.
Even if one credited oneself with being especially good at recognizing assertive 
behaviour in unfamiliar speakers, one still has a problem One of Davidson’s 
concerns is that the evidence for Radical Interpretation should be evidence available 
to any third person observer. So accessing the evidence cannot require of the 
interpreter any skill that is too highly specialized. There is also the question of how to 
justify limiting our interpreter to assertions at the outset. One might want to allow for 
a broader set of forces accompanying the utterances the Radical Interpreter hears. 
Allowing for a broader range of forces such as questions, commands and the rest, is 
not precluded by the entanglement of belief and meaning. The assumption that we 
observe, for example, questions and assertions would also be neutral as to the finer 
content of speaker’s beliefs and the meaning of his utterances. There should be some 
further justification for the assumption that we observe assertions rather than jokes, or 
questions. If the only justification offered for starting with assertions uOaS that 
assertions are neutral as to the precise belief expressed and the meaning of the 
utterance, then this is insufficient because other forces of utterance may also be 
neutral.
But there are further reasons why Davidson takes assertions as his starting point. The 
notion of someone’s holding something true is supposed to be basic in two respects. 
Firstly, one might expect an interpreter to be able to grasp that a speaker is affirming 
or stating something prior to grasping that someone has one of the other more 
sophisticated attitudes towards that utterance. One might be dubious that assertive 
behaviour is basic in this sense. If the interpreter is capable of telling that a speaker is 
making an assertion then he might be capable of discerning further interesting facts 
about the force which a speaker attaches to his utterances. Secondly, we might think 
assertion a more basic, less sophisticated, achievement for the speaker himself. But
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this explanation is also dubious. Perhaps demand behaviour - “Bring me a slab!” - is 
more basic than assertive behaviour - “There is a slab!
The most convincing reason for starting with assertions is that they are all that is 
needed to begin constructing a theory of meaning. It is assertions rather than 
utterances of other force that have truth-conditions. Nothing more than its truth- 
condition need be paired with an assertion to arrive at its meaning; no theory of force 
is required. Davidson’s thought may have been that the early introduction of other 
forces of utterance is an additional clutter to his methodology. Other forces of 
utterance are set aside to be dealt with later on the basis of a theory of the meaning for 
the speaker’s assertions. One might still be dissatisfied if one thought that allowing 
the interpreter access to a wider range of forces of utterance from the start had 
significant benefit, or if one did not think that the meaning of utterances of other 
forces could be explained by a modification of one’s account of the meaning of 
assertions.
3.5 Holding Belief Fixed to Solve for Meaning
A speaker makes an assertion as a result of the interplay of two things: what they 
believe to be the case and what the sentence means. If we could pin down either of 
these factors then we could solve for the other. If we knew what someone meant by 
an assertion then we could work out what they believed and similarly, if we knew 
what belief they expressed we could work out what they meant. In taking a speaker to 
be responding to the same aspects of the world that the interpreter would, Davidson 
saw the interpreter as pinning down the speaker’s belief. Without DPOC, Davidson 
thought we would have to find out what a speaker believed before we could start 
working out the meanings of their sentences. But working out what the speaker 
believed would involve us interpreting their utterances. Davidson prohibited his 
interpreter from assuming anything about the speaker’s beliefs and meanings prior to 
engaging in interpretation. There is nothing in this dictum that implies the 
inadmissibility of knowledge about a speaker’s beliefs acquired prior to
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interpretation; it is rather that Davidson did not think that such knowledge was 
possible prior to interpreting the speaker’s words and vice-versa. One should be alert 
to the possibility that there is knowledge available prior to interpretation that can tell 
us something about a speaker’s beliefs and does not involve us in interpreting their 
words, and vice-versa.
Davidson takes the feet that DPOC can effect a disentanglement of questions of 
meaning and questions of belief as justification for its adoption. The speaker’s beliefs 
are fixed in close accord with the interpreter’s through his finding their beliefs to be 
consistent and directed towards the same features of the world as his would be. There 
is no complete disentanglement on this approach as beyond a certain point there is no 
deciding between a speaker’s using words as we do but with odd beliefs and their 
using words differently.83 Davidson does not enter into much discussion of what 
degree of indeterminacy resides here and by what factors the degree of indeterminacy 
is fixed.
In applying DPOC the interpreter assigns truth-conditions to a speaker’s utterances 
that make the speaker right when “plausibly possible”84, according to the interpreter’s 
surmising of the observable circumstances. Davidson was skeptical that anything 
general could be said about the kind of agreement that could be “plausibly” found 
between speaker and interpreter (see 3.3). We take a speaker’s holding a sentence true 
as evidence for that sentence’s truth in the observable circumstances.85 Similarly, 
Davidson was skeptical that anything of a general nature could be said about the 
evidential relation between something’s being asserted by a speaker and its being true 
on the occasion of utterance.86
The interpreter can make room for more radical differences in the circumstances 
under which some sentences are held true than others. Some sentences have causes of
83 1968, pp. 101.
84 1973a, pp.137.
85 1974a, pp. 152.
86 See 1974a, 2001b p.xvii-xix
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assent and dissent that come and go whilst some sentences are assented to or 
dissented to come what may. A simple addition may be held true in any 
circumstance but the truth of a sentence about the weather is sensitive to the 
circumstances. Whilst neither the occasion sentences nor standing sentences were 
epistemologically privileged on Davidson’s view, there is a priority in the order of 
interpretation. The interpreter enters into the speaker’s language by giving the truth- 
conditions of a host of occasion sentences that express beliefs about the observable 
circumstances.
The interpreter should take into account individual differences among speakers and 
their environment that may have caused discrepancies in the circumstances under 
which a sentence is held true:
We get a first approximation to a finished theory by assigning to sentences of a speaker
conditions of truth that actually obtain (in our own opinion) just when the speaker holds those
sentences true. The guiding policy is to do this as far as possible, subject to considerations of
simplicity, hunches about the effects of social conditioning, and of course commonsense, or
87scientific knowledge of explicable error.
With this mention of the use of scientific knowledge we are given a hint that 
Davidson is not delimiting the evidential base for interpretation in as narrow and 
behaviouristic a way as Quine had done in his account of Radical Translatioa 
However, many of Davidson’s statements of the available of evidence (see 4.1, 4.4) 
do not take these points seriously. With his mention of hunches about conditioning 
and common sense, one gets the uncomfortable feeling that there are elements 
creeping into interpretation which, even if pragmatically justifiable, are not 
substantiated by evidence. They also introduce an element of indeterminacy as there 
may be more than one defensible view of what our common sense amounts to and 
what it licenses.
3.6 Testing a Theory of Meaning
87 1974b, pp. 196.
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As the interpreter accumulates a body of hypothetical T-sentences he can begin 
testing his theory. The T-sentences are tested as an overall theory of what the 
speaker’s words mean and as the theorist gathers more evidence so the level of 
speculation diminishes. The hypotheses about the beliefs and meanings of the speaker 
are constantly subject to revision:
88Each case tests a theory and depends on one.
The interpreter tries to observe as many occasions of the speaker’s utterances as 
possible. As he tests the T-sentences collectively, he hopes to shed light on the 
structure of the speaker’s sentences. The repetition of words, strings of words and 
structural features of sentences are the data for axiomatisation. A hypothetical T- 
sentence maintains its place in a scheme of interpretation if it is not disconfirmed by 
the evidence or replaced by an equally well-confirmed but simpler T-sentence. 
Attributing one belief to a speaker involves attributing him many others and 
corroboration for the speaker having any of those other beliefs must be found 
elsewhere in the theory. The logical relations that hold between beliefs and the 
holistic nature of belief ascription mean that if a speaker and interpreter hold the same 
sentence true and share the same logic89 they must have many more beliefs in 
common. So evidence that the speaker rejects one of the beliefs implied by the belief 
set the interpreter has attributed him is evidence against that attribution.
3.7 Making Disagreement Intelligible Against a Background of Agreement
Davidson’s approach is often criticized for loading the deck in favour of too much 
agreement between speaker and interpreter. His response was that his method is not 
intended to eliminate disagreement. Rather his method accounts for disagreement; 
making disagreement between speaker and interpreter intelligible requires grounding
“ lMOfcpp.221.
89 ftlObPP-221: “we have no choice....... but to read our own logic into die thoughts of a speaker”.
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it in agreement. There must be some agreement in subject matter between interpreter 
and speaker for there to be something about which they disagree. For Davidson, 
interpreting a speaker as pronouncing on a certain subject matter requires the 
interpreter to find much truth and in his surrounding beliefs.
Davidson was anxious that one should not think of DPOC’s virtues as resting on an 
assumption about human intelligence that could turn out to be ill founded:
The methodological advice to interpret in a way that optimizes agreement should not be
conceived as resting on a charitable assumption about human intelligence that might turn out
to be false. If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behaviour of a
creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, we have
90no reason to count that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything.
DPOC is justified by its indispensable role in disentangling questions of belief and 
meaning. The degree of truth and consistency with which it endows the speaker is 
justified by the thought that disagreement between interpreter and speaker is only 
intelligible against a backdrop of agreement and that we weaken the intelligibility of 
belief attributions when we fail to find a consistent pattern in the speaker’s beliefs:
To see too much unreason on the part of others is simply to undermine our ability to
91understand what it is they are so unreasonable about.
A background of mundane and widespread agreement is imposed on an interpretation 
scheme by repeated applications of DPOC to behavioural evidence (this point is 
explained at length in 4.1). The holistic nature of belief attribution implies that 
agreement in subject matter between interpreter and speaker cannot be established 
independently of a high degree of agreement in opinion. Beliefs are individuated by 
their position in a network of beliefs. Davidson was keen to emphasise the masses of
90 1973a, pp. 137.
91 ibid
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agreement on trivial matters that ensures interpreter and speaker are thinking about 
the same content. He thought that this underlying agreement easily escapes attention.
One might wonder why the interpreter finds a degree of truth in the speaker’s beliefs 
rather than systematically rejecting them as false. This point turns on the 
incompatibility of, on the one hand, the interpreter taking the speaker to be 
responding to the same aspect of the observable circumstances and doing so with a 
degree of consistency, and on the other, taking the speaker’s beliefs to exhibit a high 
degree of falsity. The interpreter finding enough of the speaker’s related beliefs false 
undermines the instruction that he take the speaker to be responding to the same 
aspect of the observable circumstances that he would (see 4.1 for further discussion). 
By taking the utterances with which he is presented as merely expressions of false 
belief the interpreter does not gain himself any evidence for a T-sentence. The 
assumption that the utterance “Gavagai” is false in the presence of a rabbit does not 
imply the hypothesis that:
“Gavagai” is true if and only if there is not a rabbit.
It does not imply this hypothesis because the assumption merely that the utterance is 
false, that it expresses a false belief, does not establish any connection between the 
utterance and the observable circumstances. On assuming merely that the utterance is 
false, the interpreter would do as well to pair “Gavagai” with any truth-conditions that 
do not obtain. What the interpreter needs to establish a link between the verbal 
behaviour he observes and the observable circumstances is his speaker to be 
responding to the observable environment. This is what is ensured for the interpreter 
by POCor. But once we accept POCor then the idea that we could take our speaker to 
exhibit a high degree of false belief is a non-starter: the holistic nature of belief 
attribution entails that for the interpreter to make sense of the speaker’s responding to 
the same feature of the world as the interpreter would, speaker and interpreter must 
exhibit much background agreement in belief.
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4. The Available Evidence and the Status of Charity
4.1 DPOC as a Necessity of Interpretation
Davidson’s argument for adopting DPOC was that we must adopt it. If we refuse to 
then, he claimed, interpretation becomes impossible. So if his opponent rejects DPOC 
but believes interpretation to be possible then he must provide an alternative account 
of how it can be carried out. With the correct understanding of Davidson’s views in 
hand, the aim of this fourth section is to undermine the claim that good interpreters 
must adopt DPOC. Davidson’s idea was that whatever the utterances with which an 
interpreter is initially presented mean, and whatever some speaker believes in uttering 
them, the utterances can only provide an evidential basis for a T-sentence if we accept 
that the utterances are responses to the observable circumstances. More specifically, 
we must accept that they are responses to those aspects of the circumstances the 
interpreter finds relevant or salient; the aspects he would respond to. The holistic 
nature of Radical Interpretation entails that this sharing of subject matter will amount 
to a degree of shared related beliefs. In accepting these assumptions we can begin to 
pin down what the speaker believes, and in doing so determine what it is his words 
mean.
In the interpreter’s first encounters with the speaker, the observable circumstances on 
the occasions of utterances provide evidence for interpretations of the utterances only 
if the interpreter takes the observable circumstances to be realizations of the truth- 
conditions of the utterances under interpretation. This is not to say that Davidson’s 
interpreter can attribute no false beliefs in the early stages of interpretation. The point 
is that when the interpreter attributes false beliefs in the early stages of interpretation, 
he undermines the instruction that he take the speaker to be responding to the same 
features of observable circumstances. The interpreter and speaker sharing a subject 
matter, namely some aspect of the observable circumstances, is contingent on Some 
agreement in their beliefs about that subject matter. This agreement is only secured as 
the interpreter pairs the speaker’s utterances with sentences of his own. Too much
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early disagreement leaves no shared subject matter on which interpreter and speaker 
can disagree. Thus the POCor which instructs the interpreter to take the speaker to be 
world directed is said to endow a degree of true belief. Davidson was, of course, not 
ruling out that the interpreter could impute false beliefs to the speaker. Rather he was 
claiming that the interpreter can only begin to make sense of imputing true or false 
beliefs against accumulated T-sentences formed by applying DPOC. Davidson’s view 
was that adopting DPOC was the only feasible way to construct a truth-conditional 
theory of meaning for a speaker. Davidson thought that if an interpreter applied 
DPOC to the behavioural evidence on a case-by-case basis and satisfied the formal 
constraints on a theory of meaning, he has done all that good interpretation requires.
A familiar objection to Davidson’s reasoning92 is that the interpreter would do just as 
well to start off assuming that the utterances to which he is exposed are false. It is not 
an assumption of Davidson’s method that the first utterances with which the 
interpreter is confronted must be counted true but application of the POCor and the 
holistic nature of belief ensure that the interpretable speaker must enjoy a degree of 
true belief. Nevertheless, let us consider what this assumption of falsity which has 
been proposed as a challenge to Davidson could amount to.
The falsity of an uttered sentence in and of itself implies neither that there is a 
particular connection nor that there is any connection at all between the sentence and 
the observable circumstances. So why would Davidson’s opponent think that the 
mere assumption that an utterance is false could earn the interpreter any content for 
his theory to work on? Imagine a principle of “Uncharity” which instructed the 
interpreter to find a link between utterances and the observable circumstances such 
that when the interpreter hears the unfamiliar utterance “Gavagai” upon the 
appearance of a rabbit he takes the utterance to be false. It might then seem natural to 
adopt the hypothesis that:
“Gavagai” is true if and only if a rabbit has not appeared.
92 For example, McGinn, 1977.
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But on the assumption merely that the utterance is false the interpreter is entirely 
unjustified in adopting such a hypothesis. The Uncharitable Interpreter is forging a 
link between the utterance and the circumstances where, on the assumption merely 
that the utterance is false, no such link obtains. The relationship that the interpreter 
finds between an utterance, about which all he knows is that it is false, and the 
observable circumstances should be a spurious one; not the negation of the relation 
that would obtain if the utterance were true. The utterance merely being false does not 
imply that it has anything to do with rabbits and their appearance or otherwise. It is 
only by invoking a POCor that one links the utterance to the circumstances, and we 
have seen Davidson’s reasons for thinking that applying POCor endows the speaker 
with a degree of true belief. The Uncharitable interpreter has no more reason to assign 
“Gavagai” the truth-condition that a rabbit has not appeared than he has to assign to it 
any other truth-conditions that do not obtain. He has no complement to the Charitable 
interpreter’s POCor but to provide him with one would be to endow the speaker with 
some true belief. When one offends against the POCor one seems to sever the 
connection between the subject’s utterances and his environment, and when one 
adopts a POCor in interpretation one thereby endows the speaker with some true 
belief.
DPOC comes down to making such a link between speaker’s utterances and the 
observable circumstances intelligible if interpretation is to proceed. When the 
interpreter takes the speaker to be responding to some feature of his environment, he 
endows the speaker with enough true belief to secure a shared subject matter and 
enough consistency to ensure that we can count the speaker as having beliefs at all. It 
is in this way that Davidson saw DPOC as indispensable to interpretation, rather than 
a means to choose between equally possible, rival theories of interpretation. Strictly 
in the first stages of interpretation it makes no sense to talk of agreement between the 
beliefs of the interpreter and the speaker. Beliefs and meanings are brought out as the 
interpreter begins to impose structure on accumulated evidence. Even the interpreter’s 
methodological precept that the observable circumstances provide direct evidence for
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the truth-conditions of any particular utterance is a hypothesis about that utterance 
that may be discarded when we have worked our way into the speaker’s language. 
Observable circumstances are not direct evidence for the truth-conditions of 
mathematical or logical statements for example. It is occasion sentences that serve as 
the entering wedge into the speaker’s language and the crucial part of Davidson’s 
account is his proposal for how an interpreter can enter into the speaker’s language:
I propose that we take the fact that speakers of a language hold a sentence to be true (under 
observed circumstances) as prima facie evidence that the sentence is true under those 
circumstances. For example, positive instances of “Speakers (of German) hold cEs schneit’ 
true when, and only when, it is snowing” should be taken not only to confirm the
generalization, but also the T-sentence, “‘Es schneit’ is true (in German) for a speaker x at
93time t if and only if it is snowing at t (and near x)”.
Davidson takes the evidential relation between utterances, their truth-conditions and 
the observable circumstances to be the following. An utterance in observable 
circumstances is evidence that the observable circumstances realize the truth- 
conditions of that utterance. It seems to me that there are different relations between 
utterances and their conditions of truth that might be serviceable as grounds for 
interpretation. One such relation is to take the utterance on an occasion as one source 
of defeasible evidence amongst several sources of evidence for truth-conditions. 
Davidson allows that the prima facie evidence is defeasible but only by more of the 
same, namely verbal and perhaps non-verbal behaviour in observable circumstances. 
The remainder of this thesis attempt to explain why Davidson had this single-source 
conception of the evidence and to explore what the alternative suggestion might come 
to.
Another evidential relation between utterances and their truth-conditions one might 
consider is to take the utterance on an occasion only as evidence that the utterance is a 
response to the observable circumstances, and then to resist Davidson’s move from 
agreement in subject matter to agreement in belief (this suggestion is discussed in
93 1974a, pp. 152
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4.3). One might wonder whether, even in the first instances, a speaker’s holding a 
sentence true in observable circumstances might be evidence for a T-sentence even if 
the sentence actually turns out to be false to those circumstances. This is possible on 
Davidson’s method: we can use an utterance as evidence for a T-sentence and then, 
retrospectively, against the background of accumulated T-sentences see that the 
utterance was in fact false. It is a question of whether taking the speaker to be 
responding to his environment, being world directed, implies that the interpreter must 
at the outset attribute the speaker beliefs that are true by his lights. Davidson’s 
problem with attributing false beliefs in the early encounters is the following. If in 
first encounters we take our speaker to be world directed but attribute him a false 
belief say the belief that there is a white rabbit when in the presence of a black rabbit, 
then we may undermine our attribution to the speaker of a belief about the very same 
rabbit to which the interpreter is responding.
Within the framework of Radical Interpretation, making sense of a speaker’s 
engaging with a particular subject matter involves attributing him some true collateral 
beliefs. If one could gather evidence about the subject matter of a speaker’s beliefs 
independently of Radical Interpretation then one might plausibly claim that 
establishing a link between an occasioned utterance and the observable circumstances 
does not involve the attribution of collateral true belief. We might then take the 
utterance as one piece of defeasible evidence amongst others for the truth not of the 
sentence uttered but only of some T-sentence. A defeasible piece of evidence here 
meaning roughly: evidence, the importance of which may diminish in light of other 
evidence.
Davidson thought that if the utterance is to be evidence for the T-sentence then the 
utterance must also be evidence of its own truth. We have seen that in Radically 
Interpreting a speaker we ascribe beliefs to a speaker and meanings to his words, and 
that in ascribing him one belief we ascribe many. From this point about the holistic 
nature of ascriptions of belief and meaning we have been alerted to the fact that our 
interpreter must be careful in making his ascriptions not to ascribe such a degree of
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false belief as would obscure his speaker responding to a shared subject matter. TheOp
possibility mentioned above and which this thesis focuses^is that an interpretable 
utterance need not be counted as evidence of its own truth in order to count as one 
piece of mere evidence amongst other sources of defeasible evidence for a T- 
sentence.
To take an example, imagine an interpreter in the radical situation who hears the 
words “s’ti gniwons” when it appears to him to be snowing. Our interpreter may go 
on to form the hypothetical T-sentence “<s’ti gniwons> is true if and only if it’s 
snowing”. One might take the utterance <s’ti gniwons> in the observable 
circumstances as evidence for this hypothetical T-sentence without taking the 
utterance as evidence for its own truth in those circumstances. One might take the 
utterance to be one source of defeasible evidence for the truth-conditions of the 
sentence, and claim that there are other sources of defeasible evidence. The question 
of whether the utterance is true would then be an independent question. The link 
between an utterance and the observable circumstances that obtains when an 
utterance is true is only one link between the speaker and the observable 
circumstances but there are others. It is not the case that unless we take an utterance 
as evidence of its own truth then we cannot make use of the observable circumstances 
of an utterance in constructing a T-sentence. The choice that Davidson presents us 
with is between, on the one hand, DPOC and, on the other, putting the content of a 
speaker’s beliefs entirely beyond the interpreter’s reach. This choice may be a 
misleading one. It may be misleading in its suggestion that if we do not employ a 
POCor and, in doing so, endow our speaker with much true belief, we are depriving a 
theory of interpretation of any connection to the conditions under which an utterance 
is made. We should be open to the idea that the connections between a speaker and 
his environment can be investigated in a range of ways, and that these investigations 
produce evidence that should be made available to and employed by the interpreter.
What is up for consideration is the claim that there are kinds of evidence relevant to 
interpreting a speaker which play only a peripheral role in Davidson’s methodology.
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This contention is not novel in itself4 but the rationale provided here for this 
conclusion is different and offers a new kind of challenge to Davidsoa There are 
fundamentals on which this challenge to DPOC can be distinguished from some other 
prominent challenges and some preliminary remarks will help place this thesis in that 
context (4.2, 4.3 and 4.5 distinguish my position from the nearby relatives. 4.4 
explains the source of my disagreement with Davidson). The account of DPOC given 
in section three is more comprehensive and accurate to Davidson than those to be 
found in Grandy, McGinn or Lewis.95 My aim is not to offer an alternative master 
principle of interpretation, which is the issue to which Grandy directs his attention 
(4.2). There was some discussion in this section of the possibility of securing shared 
subject matter without shared belief, and McGinn pursues this route via a causal 
theory of belief (4.3). He claims that building a causal theory of belief into 
interpretation will turn the trick but it is suggested here that this is not the right way to 
go. Whilst the challenge presented here is congenial to Lewis’s broader view of the 
available evidence it does not rely on the kind of reductionism implied by Lewis’s 
paper (4.5).
It was Davidson’s contention that without DPOC we would have to know something 
about a speaker’s beliefs to begin interpreting their words. Since such knowledge is 
deemed unavailable by Davidson we must employ DPOC. It was mentioned above 
that there may be more sources of defeasible evidence for T-sentences than Davidson 
allows. We should not share Davidson’s pessimism about the relevance of knowledge 
available prior to interpretation to helping discern a speaker’s beliefs. Davidson’s 
claim that no useful evidence or knowledge is available prior to interpretation should 
be put under the spotlight. There are sources of evidence marginalized by Davidson 
and they may constitute the kind of knowledge he deems unavailable. If one can 
make it plausible that knowledge helpful to discerning meanings or beliefs may be 
available prior to interpretation then one undermines Davidson’s strong claims about
94 Grandy, 1973. Lewis, 1974. McGinn, 1977.
95 The differences are explained in the respective sections below. Grandy’s argument is a response to 
Quine rather than DPOC. It should be borne in mind that these papers were published whilst DPOC 
was undergoing significant change and their characterisations of DPOC may have been more accurate 
to Davidson’s writings at the time of publication.
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the necessity of DPOC to interpretatioa What follows in section four is a challenge to 
the claim that there is no evidence available prior to interpretation that is relevant to 
the disentanglement of meaning and belief. By making it plausible that we can gather 
such information about a speaker’s beliefs or language as would pin down either to a 
significant degree, one undermines Davidson’s claim that DPOC is a sine qua non of 
interpretatioa If such evidence is admissible, and available in impressive quantities, 
then DPOC would take on a less central role in interpretation.
The major source of the extra evidence alluded to is the natural, human sciences. 
Empirical inquiries into psychology, linguistics, optics, and other branches of the 
sciences of human nature are concerned with speakers and their relations to 
environments. These sciences highlight the similarities and differences between 
humans in the way they interact with their environment and come to speak a 
language. Of course research in these fields is often concerned with similarities and 
differences between humans and other organisms, and these findings may also be 
revealing. It seems to me highly plausible that learning about the way a speaker 
interacts with his environment will be illuminating of, and a constraint on, the kind of 
beliefs which it is feasible to ascribe him. If we discover through empirical 
investigation that some speaker is a lot like us in the way that he interacts with his 
environment then this will be evidence that the speaker responds to the same aspect of 
the observable circumstances to which we, as interpreters, respond. We may then 
proceed by hypothetical maxims to interpretations that are much like those the POCor 
would imply. But our finding out about such similarity and employing that 
knowledge would not serve as a justification of DPOC as a precondition of 
interpretatioa We might, on the contrary, find out that our speaker is dissimilar in 
some relevant respect. If a speaker could not interact with his environment in the way 
that we do this may put the formation of certain beliefs beyond him.96 A crude 
example could involve a speaker who had no sense of smell. Our attaining the 
knowledge that an unfamiliar speaker suffered from this deficiency would be
96 This same point could be made positively. If the speaker interacts with his environment in a way that 
we cannot, there may be beliefs that he could form that are beyond us.
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evidence against the speaker responding to the some features of the observable 
circumstances that we do and holding the related beliefs. This information seems to 
be available prior to interpretation and available in ever more sophisticated varieties, 
and it is relevant to what the speaker’s beliefs are.97
There are several places where Davidson makes piecemeal concessions to a broader 
conception of the evidence. But he nowhere notices the full significance that 
marshalling such evidence could have with regard to the status of DPOC. Where such 
evidence serves to corroborate similarities between speaker and interpreter in terms of 
the way they respond to their environment then it can serve to make good the POCor. 
More generally such evidence as is relevant to pinning down a speaker’s beliefs and 
is available to the interpreter can fulfill the role of holding belief to some degree fixed 
-  precisely the role for which DPOC was invoked. Despite a few limited concessions, 
it is clear that Davidson did not agree that there were sources of evidence other than 
verbal behaviour available prior to interpretatioa If Davidson had recognized that 
more evidence was both available and useful to the interpreter then he would not have 
proceeded in the directions he did. Had Davidson seen the sharing of subject matter 
between interpreter and speaker that the POCor instructs us to find as something we 
might investigate, rather than assume, then he would not have sought to underpin the 
POCor with his discussion of Triangulatioa Moreover, if Davidson had recognized 
that there was evidence available to the interpreter relevant to effecting the 
disentanglement of meaning and belief then he would have not have defended DPOC 
as a necessary condition on constructing a theory of interpretation.
4.2 Grandy’s Principle of Humanity
Grandy famously advocated a move from a POC to a Principle of Humanity. The 
POC with which he found fault came from Quine and several of his criticisms are 
highly plausible. Here is the principle that Grandy advocated:
97 A more sophisticated example would be the recent mapping of the cochlea and the importance of 
this structure to the subject’s placing of sounds.
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If a translation tells us that the other person’s beliefs and desires are connected in a way that is
too bizarre for us to make sense of, then the translation is useless for our purposes. So we
have a pragmatic constraint on translation, the condition that the imputed pattern of beliefs,
desires, and the world be as similar to our own as possible. This principle I shall call the 
98principle o f humanity.
If we find DPOC unsatisfactory, we might think there is some other aprioristic 
principle of interpretation that we should adhere to. The purpose of this thesis is not 
to offer an alternative principle to Davidson’s but to explore and question the status 
we should afford such principles, and to propose a more open-armed methodology; to 
relax Davidson’s own approach. But it is worth saying something about Grandy’s 
Principle of Humanity (henceforth, POH) because it is often thought to be an 
improvement on DPOC. As such, one might think it remedies the complaints made in 
the present thesis against Davidson. This thesis presses the claim that we should be 
cautious of principles that have the status not of hypothetical maxims of investigation 
but of strong, a priori conditions on interpretation
The POC which Grandy criticises is Quine’s rather than DPOC, so one should be 
alert to the differences between the two. The POC that Grandy was challenging 
instructed the interpreter to maximize agreement on obvious truths; Quine included 
observation sentences and logical statements in this category. Davidson did not accept 
Quine’s distinction between the observation sentences and the rest, and was 
concerned to optimize intelligibility rather than agreement. Several of Grandy’s 
criticisms of Quine’s POC do not apply to DPOC.
Looking at the quoted statement of the POH, one might notice that it instructs the 
translator to impute a higher degree of similarity than is required by the condition that 
a translation be intelligible. It is true that a translation that is too bizarre for the 
translator to make sense of will be useless. But this does not entail that we plump for 
the translation makes the subject as similar as possible to ourselves. It only follows
98 Grandy, 1973,p.443.
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that we discard translations that make someone unintelligible. There are degrees of 
similarity that a translator can find between himself and his subject. What degree of 
similarity the translator finds should be sensitive to the evidence he collects. It is 
implausible to suggest that only a translation that makes the subject as similar to us as 
possible could further our understanding of a subject. It is a plus point of DPOC that 
it does not impose such cognitive parochialism.99
An interesting aspect of Grandy’s paper is the very broad role he envisages for a 
POH. He introduces the POH in the context of translation, as a rival to Quine’s POC. 
But he also thinks of POH as a means by which, once we already have a theory of a 
speaker’s beliefs and desires and a translation manual, we might go about predicting a 
speaker’s behaviour. Grandy thinks a POH is needed to prevent a translator 
attributing inexplicably held beliefs: beliefs that may be true by the translator’s lights 
but inaccessible to the speaker. So in assessing Grandy’s principle one is confronted 
by the question of what counts as a good reason for a subject’s having a belief. One 
should bear in mind that Davidson saw DPOC as a necessary condition on getting a 
theory of the speaker’s beliefs at all; a condition on attributing any beliefs, odd or 
otherwise, to a speaker:
When she (the interpreter) suddenly finds herself crediting the L-speaker with an inexplicable 
belief, she must have a specific semantic location in the structure of L for the sentence, in so 
far as she believes she knows what it means, but has no similar place for the odd belief in her
pattern of beliefs The oddness of the belief presupposes that the interpreter has assigned
meanings to the words of the sentences.100
DPOC is by Davidson’s lights a necessary condition on constructing a theory of 
meaning for a speaker, and theories of a speaker’s meanings and beliefs come 
together. So arguments for alternative principles that assume we already have theories
99 Grandy’s statement of a principle of translation may be erroneous in another way. A translator does 
not state any semantical truths. The translator’s manual gives us a mapping of the sentences of one 
language onto sentences of another language with the same meaning. But it does not say what it is for 
any of those sentences to be true. So a translation manual does not relate beliefs and desires to the 
world.
100 Ramberg, 1989, pp.78.
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of meaning and belief in place will not cut to the heart of the claim that DPOC is a 
necessity of interpretatioa Grandy has a rather different role in mind for his POH. 
The POH is employed on a step-by-step basis, first yielding a translation of the 
speaker’s language into our own, then determining the speaker’s beliefs and desires 
and then predicting actions:
The actual use of translation in this prediction process is only one of the intermediate steps. 
We can translate verbal behaviour into our own language and use this to determine what the 
person’s beliefs and desires are, and then use that information to predict actions.
For Davidson, none of these activities can be carried out in isolation: one cannot give 
a theory of meaning, belief or action independently of one another. In Davidson’s 
method DPOC was designed to solve the problem of the entanglement of meaning 
and belief. If one could translate a speaker prior to working out what their beliefs and 
desires were we would not need to employ DPOC. Grandy is working on the 
hypothesis that one can compile a translation manual prior to determining what the 
speaker’s beliefs are. Davidson thought the construal of a speaker’s words impossible 
prior to theorizing about a speaker’s beliefs.
Grandy thought that in obtaining a theory of belief and desire, together with facts 
about non-verbal behaviour, one would not have sufficient evidence to give a 
determinate prediction of a subject’s behaviour. Grandy is concerned that a subject’s 
actions should be predictable and that the inputs he highlights are insufficient for such 
prediction. He takes it that, given this insufficiency, we need some further model of 
the subject and he moves for a POH.
In theory we could (perhaps) elicit the total belief-and-desire structure and use mathematical 
decision theory to arrive at the prediction, but this is not what we do in practice. And since it 
is the actual processes of communication that was our original concern, we must look for an 
alternative model. The most obvious alternative is that we use ourselves in order to arrive at 
the prediction: we consider what we should do if we had the relevant beliefs and desires.101
101 Grandy, 1973, p.442.
53
Grandy assumes that the mechanism for prediction that we use in conjunction with a 
theory of belief-and-desire must be readily available in communication: it must be 
one that we actually do or could make use of rather than one that is overly technical 
or sophisticated. He does not consider that decision theory might be a systematisation 
of what we actually do or a theory of which we have an implicit knowledge. For 
Grandy the natural procedure is to use ourselves as models for predicting the 
speaker’s behaviour and this is enshrined in the POH.
But looked at in this way, POH is not a method for disentangling questions of 
meaning and belief, and construing a subject’s words. Rather, Grandy’s main concern 
is with a method for the prediction and explanation of behaviour, verbal or otherwise. 
He does not concern himself with the indeterminacy that arises from the entanglement 
of questions of meaning and belief (although a POH could perhaps be employed in 
holding belief fixed). Moreover, there are less ambitious theories than the one Grandy 
has in mind, theories that do not go as far as offering predictions of behaviour, which 
could claim to provide an interpretation of a speaker.
There are some puzzling aspects of the methodology that Grandy describes. He 
claims for example that.
Whether our simulation (of a subject) is successful will depend heavily on the similarity of his
102belief-desire network to our own.
But he has not provided us with any independent means to assess whether a belief- 
desire network is like our own. His instruction was simply: impute a pattern of beliefs 
and desires to the speaker which is “as similar to our own as possible”. If the 
translator then witnesses behaviour that seems to disconfirm his attribution of a 
belief-desire network to a speaker it is unclear by what principle he should proceed. 
By Grandy’s lights we cannot tell, independently of this simulation, whether the
102 Grandy, 1973, p.443.
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speaker is similar to us and, hence, whether our simulation has been successful. What 
would help is a means to grade the similarity of belief-desire networks to our own. 
Then if the translator made an inaccurate prediction of behaviour based on attributing 
the speaker the pattern of beliefs and desires most similar to the translator’s own, he 
could move to attribute the most similar pattern consistent with the new evidence. 
One should bear in mind that some of the plausibility of Grandy’s POH resides in the 
fact that when one imagines how the project of translation will actually be carried out, 
one tends to imagine even unfamiliar speakers as being a lot like us. Thus, we find it 
plausible that imputing patterns of belief and desire similar to our own will yield 
acceptable results. One should bear in mind that however well POH may turn out to 
serve as a rule-of-thumb, finding out about the similarity or otherwise of the speakers 
with which one is confronted ought to be a goal of interpretation.
The POC that Grandy found in Quine’s account of Radical Translation and wished to 
criticize was the following:
choose that translation which maximized agreement (at least of certain sorts) between
ourselves and our translatee.103
The agreement “of certain sorts” is agreement on obvious truths such as those of logic 
and of observatioa It was worth stressing the differences between DPOC and Quine’s 
POC. It is plain from the quotation that Grandy sees Quine’s POC as a rule by which 
to choose between alternative manuals of translatioa We should remember that, 
whether rightly or wrongly, Davidson saw DPOC as a necessary condition on 
obtaining a theory of meaning for a speaker, not as a means by which to choose 
amongst several possible rivals. The role of DPOC consisted in fixing belief by 
finding responsiveness to the environment and consistency in a speaker so as to solve 
for meaning. DPOC presents a moving target to Grandy’s arguments: Davidson has 
moved away from the old Quinian dictum involving maximizing agreement on 
obvious truths.
103 Grandy, 1973,pp.440.
55
Grandy considers a complicated theorem of quantification theory that can be proved 
but could, prior to one’s seeing the proof, appear invalid. Grandy imagines showing 
the theorem to someone and asking them if it is valid. It is quite possible, perhaps 
likely, that they will give the wrong answer. But Quine’s POC instructed us to 
maximize agreement on logical truths and translate the speaker so that he takes the 
theorem to be valid. It strikes me that in making the following sorts of injunction:
the past history of a speaker is quite relevant to the question of what is obvious to him.......
We should not go out of our way to find some complicated agreement on this logical truth, 
because the error is not only explainable but was predictable given some knowledge of his 
past history.104
Grandy is accommodating a point that Davidson too is concerned to accommodate. 
Grandy suggests that if we take the subject’s past history into account it is both 
explicable and predictable that they should give the wrong answer. They have never 
seen the proof or such complicated theorems before. But DPOC does not counsel us 
to find agreement on complex logical truths at any expense to the simplicity and 
intelligibility of the interpretatioa DPOC aims to optimise the subject’s intelligibility 
and consistency not simply his agreeableness.
Grandee’s master argument is that he has recognized cases in which Quine’s POC X  
leads to unnatural translations which attribute a speaker true but inexplicable beliefs. 
Grandy’s points, whilst solid against the maximizing version, do not carry over to 
DPOC. On DPOC there are cases even at the outset in which the interpretation of a 
sentence involves the attribution of a false belief. Grandy recognizes that even 
Quine’s POC can accommodate the attribution of false beliefs to a speaker. But the 
cases Grandy has in mind are widespread and can be generated systematically, so 
Quine’s POC cannot accommodate them For Grandy these cases are best accounted
104 Grandy, 1973,pp.443-4.
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for using a POH that can take account of causal evidence afforded only a peripheral 
role by Quine’s POC.
The case Grandy focuses on is the following. Paul arrives at a party. Paul asserts “The 
man with a martini is a philosopher”. There is a man in plain view who is drinking 
water from a martini glass and who is not a philosopher. There is in feet only one man 
drinking martini at the party. This man is a philosopher and he is standing out of sight 
in the garden. The problem is over what we should take the term “the man” as 
referring to in Paul’s assertion. Grandy notes that according to Quine’s POC we 
should take the remark at fece value and count Paul’s utterance as true, which means 
that “the man” refers to the man in the garden. But the natural thing to do is to take 
the utterance as false because we cannot explain how Paul could have the true belief 
about the man outside whom he has not seen. The falsity of the utterance is:
predicted by the principle of humanity, of course, for that constraint instructs us to prefer the 
interpretation that makes the utterance explainable.105
On Davidson’s view, attributing Paul a true belief about the man in the garden may
not be feasible by the POCor. The interpreter would not in those circumstances be
1dresponding to the man in the garden. Furthermore, attributing^Paul the belief that the 
man in the garden is a philosopher and is drinking a martini would require attributing^ 
him some surrounding beliefs for which one would have to be able to find evidence.
It is puzzling that people take G randy  points to be a straightforward counter to X  
DPOC. It is not peculiar to the POH to attribute a subject “explicable falsehood” 
rather than “mysterious truth”. DPOC mutated from an instruction to maximize 
agreement into a principle in which agreement in belief plays a part in securing 
shared subject matter, within the wider scope of explaining the limited perspective of 
a speaker. The error on the part of the speaker is explicable given the speaker’s 
perspective; given the features of the world he could be responding to and his other 
beliefs.
105 Grandy, 1973,pp.445.
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Grandy draws the moral that the POH fits best with a causal theory of belief. As 
Grandy finds a causal theory of belief integral to our understanding others, he thinks 
this speaks strongly in favour of a POH which:
directs us to bear in mind that the speaker is a person and has certain basic similarities to 
ourselves when we are choosing between translations. When we look at the actual choices we 
make, guided by this principle, it appears that part of our epistemological view of ourselves is 
what could be described loosely as a causal theory of belief, hi the example just given, the 
operative principle that makes the case forceful is that the object that would be referred to 
according to the charitable interpretation did not interact causally with the speaker. Thus the 
causal theory of belief accords much better with the principle of humanity than with the 
principle of charity.106
Obviously, the notion of someone’s sharing “certain basic similarities” with us 
requires elaboration. This may amount to something like a POCor which instructs the 
interpreter to take the speaker to be responding to the same features of the world as he 
would in the circumstances. If Paul’s patterns of belief are similar to ours then, then 
without any causal interaction with the philosopher in the garden he could not have a 
belief about which drink that person had. It is plausible that we do reason in such a 
way but it would be wrong to think that DPOC suggests something to the contrary. 
Grandy also insisted on placing heavy emphasis on the speaker’s past history, his 
verbal conditioning and his non-verbal stimulations. Davidson might not have 
thought so much information available in the radical case.
4.3 McGinn on DPOC and the Causal Theory of Belief
McGinn has criticized Davidson views on the role of DPOC on the following 
grounds. McGinn thinks that Davidson’s reason for adopting DPOC is that without 
assuming that most of a subject’s beliefs are true, we would not be able to work out 
what beliefs the subject had. McGinn claims to the contrary that observation of
106 ibid
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speakers causally interacting with objects in their environment gives independent 
grounds for ascribing them beliefs. McGinn claims that these independent grounds 
leave DPOC redundant.
McGinn is mistaken about the role of DPOC on three counts. Firstly, there is no 
general assumption within DPOC to the effect that most of a subject’s beliefs are true 
-  this is an artifact of interpretations that employ DPOC. This aspect of DPOC was 
most clearly brought out in writings that post-date McGinn’s paper. It is clear that 
McGinn has misinterpreted Davidson in this way:
charity as a methodological precept is to be insisted on because we know in advance, by a
transcendental argument of some sort, that most of what others say and believe is going to be
107true (according of course to our own view of the truth).
Secondly, strictly speaking Davidson does not think it makes any sense to talk of 
“most” of a speaker’s beliefs, beliefs being infinite in number and there being no 
useful way to count them. Thirdly, we apply DPOC in ascribing beliefs to a speaker 
but that is not the whole story of belief ascription. One employs DPOC in holding 
belief fixed so as to discern a speaker’s meanings, and we work out a speaker’s 
beliefs by knowing what their words mean. There is no way, on Davidson’s method, 
of working out what someone believes independently of interpreting their words and 
we attribute someone beliefs in tandem with interpreting their words. The Charitable 
belief ascriptions are revisable as the interpreter learns more about the speaker’s 
language.
There is common ground between fKe qn^AO^vf the point McGinn is
pressing. X ajjtee. iWMr ; are grounds independent of DPOC by which an
interpreter may begin to discern what it is that someone believes. Mc&a* ffcAthat 
merely observing the causal interaction of subject and environment can ground the 
ascription of fine-grained beliefs, whereas nothing that straightforward is defended
107 McGinn, 1977, pp.522.
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here. It is unclear exactly what fells under the umbrella of a speaker’s causal 
interaction with his environment for McGinn. If it means merely observing, as one 
does habitually, the objects and events with which some speaker is confronted then 
McGinn’s claim seems to me wrong. The speaker’s senses are bombarded by 
information from the external world and the causes of this information are many. 
Habitual observation alone cannot serve to justify the ascription of finely 
discriminated propositional attitudes: we cannot be sure, on this basis, to what aspects 
of this information a speaker is responding. Davidson cuts down on this myriad 
information by assuming that the speaker responds to that aspect of the environment 
which the interpreter would respond to under those circumstances. This thesis 
suggests that some of this work may be done by the psychological sciences.
McGinn notices that, on Davidson’s account, there are heavy burdens on attributions 
of false beliefs in the early stages of interpretation. McGinn takes this as a point 
against Davidsoa McGinn thinks that Davidson’s desired conclusion is that most of 
what others say and do must be true but this is incorrect. Davidson’s point is rather 
that those interpretable using DPOC will exhibit much truth and consistency. McGinn 
thinks of DPOC as the assumption that most of a speaker’s beliefs must be true, and 
seeks to find in Davidson’s writings some argument to that effect that comes prior to 
and stands apart from the activity of interpretation.
McGinn notes the problem of entanglement but misses the importance of DPOC in 
that context. For Davidson it is only by holding belief fixed that we can effect a 
systematic pairing of utterances and their truth-conditions. Davidson’s real argument 
for DPOC is not “transcendental”, it is that there is no feasible way to accomplish the 
disentanglement other than by applying DPOC. McGinn thinks that in disentangling 
meaning and belief one does as well by taking a speaker to have felse belief as a true 
one:
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For we may equally provide a basis for deriving the meanings of sentences held true by
108uncharitably imputing false beliefs to our speaker
But for Davidson establishing some shared content between speaker and interpreter 
requires establishing some shared belief. We have also seen that the mere assumption 
of falsity cannot pin to a belief a particular content or range of contents. If we assume 
that our speaker has made a mistake and is expressing a false belief then which one is 
it? A high instance of falsity in his surrounding web of beliefs may leave us beggared 
for a subject matter shared with the speaker. By DPOC the speaker is responding to 
the same feature of the environment as the interpreter would in the circumstances. A 
merely false belief need not be a response to the observable circumstances at all 
Knowing only that a belief is false and that all the beliefs implied by it are false does 
not serve to fix upon a content so as to facilitate the pairing of an utterance with its 
truth-conditions. What stands in the way of McGinn’s claim is Radical Interpretation.
McGinn argues that we can make sense of a speaker’s belief being about a certain 
object or event without taking that someone to have a collateral constellation of other 
true beliefs concerning that object or event. McGinn argues that what allows us to 
identify someone’s belief set as a collection of “egregious misconceptions” is that 
attributions of false belief have a relational form:
in assigning such attitudes to a person, there is no presumption that the concepts (predicates) 
the reporter calls upon to pick out the entity the reported belief is said to concern, be 
themselves -  those concepts -  credited to the believer. The reporter employs his concepts to 
identify some object he takes the believer to be cognitively related to. That these concepts are 
not assumed to be possessed by the believer is indicated by keeping the vocabulary one uses 
to express the concepts outside the scope of the belief operator.... We are thus able 
intelligibly to impute preponderantly false beliefs to the ancients in relation to the earth and 
the stars without the implication that they believed these things of those entities as 
conceptualized by us.109
108 McGinn, 1977,pp.523.
109 McGinn,! 977, pp.525
61
McGinn’s idea is that the shared subject matter does not require surrounding true 
belief but is fixed causally. False believers are causally related to the same objects as 
us, but it is not required that they conceptualise them in the same way.110 A worry for 
this view of McGinn’s is that it identifies the cause of a belief with the content of that 
belief There are many cases in which the cause of a belief is not identifiable with its 
content. Imagine that some primitive people attributed mystical importance to squid 
and held some strange beliefs about what this animal is and the powers it has. It may 
be true that the appearance and activities of squid have caused many of their strange 
beliefs about a marine god but untrue that the subject matter of their belief can be 
characterized by the mundane marine activities. What allows us to hold the content 
and cause of a belief distinct is that the content of a particular belief is dependent not 
only on its causal genesis but on its place within a cluster of beliefs. If McGinn were 
right then those who held beliefs about phlogiston were really thinking about oxygen, 
because the substance oxygen was the real cause of their belief. Applications of 
POCor and POCoh do not have the implication that the content of a belief must be its 
cause. Ascribing intelligible beliefs about particular objects becomes impossible if 
those beliefs exhibit too much inconsistency and falsity. What gets in the way of 
McGinn’s argument is Radical Interpretation. The holistic nature of Radical 
Interpretation seems to ensure that agreement in subject matter will involve some 
agreement in opinion.
The POCor ensures a causal aspect to the determining of the content of beliefs. 
McGinn takes Davidson not to affirm something that it seems to me he does affirm, 
namely;
it is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of an object’s being referred to in correctly 
specifying the intentional content of a relational mental state that it -  that object -  figure 
suitably in the causal genesis of that state.111
110 Although it does seem that whatever the interpreter places inside the belief operator must be 
described using some set of the interpreter’s own concepts.
111 McGinn, 1977,pp.527.
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Compare, for example, these statements concerning the conditions Davidson 
considers necessary for content individuation:
prepositional attitudes and related events and states are in part identified in terms of their 
causal and other relations to events extraneous in time and place to the agent they 
characterize.112
Each of two people is reacting differentially to sensory stimuli streaming in from a certain
113direction. Projecting the incoming lines outward, the common cause is at their intersection.
McGinn mistakenly takes Davidson to be denying a claim that McGinn finds 
plausible: that the intentional objects of belief are in part determined by the speaker’s 
causal history. From the claim that Davidson denies this point, McGinn wants to 
motivate an alternative approach to interpretation on which we take this 
“independently plausible” thesis about the relational form of beliefs as a basis from 
which to begin interpretation.
It is because we observe that people causally interact with objects in their environment in such 
ways as enable than to have thoughts concerning those objects, paradigmatically in 
perception, that we are prepared to assign those objects to their beliefs as comprising their 
subject matter, notwithstanding the amount of bad theory they may bring to bear upon their 
objects.114
Davidson agrees that observing people interacting with their environment is the major 
source of evidence for ascribing them thoughts. The point of disagreement is over the 
autonomy of content and theory. McGinn thinks that the content of the speaker’s 
beliefs is ascertainable independently of the speaker’s theory and Davidson holism 
about belief ascription implies the contrary. Davidson recognized that merely 
observing this causal interaction with his environment will not serve to discriminate 
the contents of a speaker’s propositional attitudes. Once we apply the POCor to this
112 1997b, pp.71.
1131991, pp .213.
114 McGinn, 1977,pp.530.
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evidence we are ascribing not only a belief about the observable circumstances but 
also a cluster of beliefs needed to make sense of the speaker having the belief 
ascribed to him. Davidson was convinced that mere observation of causal chains 
underdetermines the content a mental state possesses:
the cause is doubly indeterminate with respect to width, and with respect to distance. The first 
ambiguity concerns how much of the total cause of a belief is relevant to content... The 
second problem has to do with the ambiguity of the relevant stimulus, whether it is proximal 
(at the skin, say) or distal.115
There can also be a range of causes that count as instantiations of one content. 
Davidson saw social interaction as resolving such issues and determining content:
I would introduce the social factor in a way that connects it directly with perceptual 
extemalism, thus locating the role of society within the causal nexus that includes the 
interplay between persons and the rest of nature.116
On Davidson’s picture social factors have a normative as well as a causal role in 
content individuation. Whether or not one agrees that social factors can be the factors 
that make the determining difference, we can take these remarks as showing that 
Davidson had thought through the role that a subject’s causal interaction with his 
environment plays in fixing the content of his beliefs and had not ignored the kind of 
alternative that McGinn presents.
For McGinn, like Davidson, the attributions of thoughts are tested “by seeing whether 
the agent behaves as one would who possessed those attitudes” and the verification is 
holistic. McGinn suggests that we think of a theory that would explain the observed 
facts if it were true, then test it by working out its further consequences and seeing if 
they are realized in the speaker’s behaviour. On this point, McGinn is in agreement 
with Davidson. In addition McGinn thinks that the theorist’s conjectures should
115 1997a, pp. 129-30.
116 1990,pp.201.
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accord with whatever hunches and expectations one has about a subject. One might 
find this approach more compelling if the “hunches and expectations” were replaced 
by knowledge or models from the psychological sciences. McGinn notes that his 
method is not a method in the sense of a set of instructions that select the correct 
theory without imagination on the theorist’s part. He is dubious that what we require 
is a method in this sense:
the lack of such a procedure for extracting theory from evidence does not impede science; and
indeed, it is to be assumed that radical interpretation has often been successfully undertaken
without benefit of Davidson’s method. It may well be, as Davidson’s writings suggest, that
117there can be no method without charity: but there can be interpretation without either.
McGinn’s comments on the lack of a uniform procedure for deducing theory from 
evidence are congenial to the more spontaneous and patchwork approach to 
understanding a speaker thatjtfiesis proposes as an alternative to DPOC.
4.4 Quine and Davidson: A Behaviouristic Legacy
In the introduction to Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation Davidson says that:
Only by studying the pattern of assents to sentences can we decide what is meant and what 
believed. Depending on this evidence which, without the aid of theory, makes no distinction 
between the contribution of belief and meaning to linguistic behaviour, requires a method for 
effecting the separation to a degree sufficient for communication. Devices to this end are 
described and defended in the present essays. But all of them, in one way or another, rely on 
the Principle of Charity.118
Davidson believed that it is only by finding patterns in someone’s verbal behaviour 
that we can go about understanding them. As this evidence does not serve to 
distinguish the contribution of belief and meaning to the observed behaviour,
117 McGinn, 1977,p.535.
118 2001b, pp.xix
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Davidson requires a device to effect this discrimination and it is here that DPOC 
comes in.
Davidson acknowledged Quine’s discussion of Radical Translation as the forefather 
his own account of Radical Interpretation:
The idea of a translation manual with appropriate empirical constraints as a device for 
studying problems in the philosophy of language is, of course Quine’s. This idea inspired 
much of my thinking on the present subject, and my proposal is in important respects very 
close to Quine’s.119
Although Davidson was opposed to Behaviourism as a doctrine about the reducibility 
of intentional to behavioural facts, his views on the evidence relevant to an interpreter 
derive directly from Quine’s Behaviourism about language. Quine claimed that all the 
evidence relevant to correct translation consists in facts about speakers’ overt 
dispositions to behaviour:
Language is a social art. In acquiring it we have to depend entirely on intersubjectively 
available cues as to what to say and when. Hence, there is no justification for collating 
linguistic meanings, unless in terms of men’s dispositions to respond overtly to socially 
observable stimulations.120
In compressed form this passage contains what will be discussed in a moment as 
“Quine’s acquisition argument”. The major premise of this argument is that language 
acquisition depends entirely on observation of behaviour and reinforcement of 
learned behaviour. One way of taking this premise is as a highly contentious 
empirical claim about language acquisitioa The second suppressed premise of the 
argument is that translators can draw upon no more evidence than is available in first 
language acquisition. According to Quine, the evidence available to child and 
translator cannot differ in type. The conclusion of Quine’s argument is that the only
119 1973a, pp. 129n
120 Quine, 1960, pp.ix
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available evidence to the translator is observable behaviour. Quine recognized that he 
had provided his Radical Translator with a “meagre basis”121 but maintained that “the
199native speaker has had no other”.
Davidson seems to have accepted Quine’s characterisation of the evidence but not 
Quine’s claim that if there were facts about meaning they could amount to nothing 
more than facts about behaviour. Quince had two arguments for his Behaviorist view 
of the evidence; one concerned language acquisition and the other concerned what is 
manifest in linguistic understanding. By undermining Quine’s arguments for this 
construal of the available evidence, from which Davidson’s own view derives, we 
take a substantial step towards the conclusion that Davidson is too narrow-minded 
about the kind of evidence that might be relevant to his interpreter. It then becomes an 
interesting question whether non-behavioural evidence is neutral as to the 
contribution of meaning and belief. It is revealing to view Quine’s scientific-sounding 
account of language through Chomsky’s eyes.
Given their prominence in empirical science and the antithesis they provide to 
Quine’s views, it is also worth having Chomsky’s positive views on the nature of 
language in the background. Chomsky depicts language as a mental faculty, more 
specifically; a physically realised set of psychological facts, concerning the principles 
by which the mind attributes phonetic forms and determinate meanings to physical 
objects. Chomsky’s depiction dominates empirical linguistics and provides evidence 
for the view that knowledge of meaning is represented in some way in the mind or 
brain. Chomsky’s suggests that under many circumstances features of the language 
faculty change according to pragmatics rather than any change in belief. These cases 
constitute a change in language that can be sharply distinguished from 
epistemological considerations.123 So Chomsky’s work is in conflict with the view 
that we could not have knowledge about meanings, knowledge of a speaker’s 
language, without working out what the speaker believed.
121 Quine, 1987, pp.5.
122 ibid
123 These suggestions are owed to Horwich, 1992.
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On Quine’s account of Radical Translation, the translation of observation sentences - 
those sentences for which patterns of assent and dissent are closely conditioned to 
stimulations - serves as an entering wedge into the language. Having translated some 
observation sentences, the translator can begin compounding those sentences. He also 
undertakes translations of a different kind. When there are no obvious correlations 
between a particular sentence being uttered and the concurrent stimulations, the 
linguist must note and dismantle these unconstrued sentences. Some fragments of 
these unconstrued sentences will occur in observation sentences, others will be treated 
as words and tried out in analytical pairings with expressions of the translator’s 
language. The translator tries translations that pair unconstrued non-observation 
sentences with sentences of his own with similar ostensible features. Thus, the 
translator accumulates a tentative vocabulary and grammar subject to constant tests. 
Given these details and the possibility of mounting behavioural data, one should 
allow that Quine is describing something richer than one might expect possible from 
a foundation of pairings of stimulus synonymous sentences.
Quine adhered to Physicalism: the view that ultimately the physical facts constitute 
all the facts there are. One might have expected that by Physicalist lights there would 
be more physical facts available to the translator than merely facts about verbal 
behaviour. But it is clear that Quine’s views on the facts relevant to translation are 
more austere:
There is nothing to linguistic meaning beyond what is gleaned from overt behaviour in 
observable circumstances. In order to exhibit these limitations, I propounded the thought 
experiment of radical translation.124
It would be fair to say that Quine’s arguments for this austerity have not found many 
supporters.
124 Quine, 1987, pp.5.
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The crucial point for Quine is that all the determinants of meaning must be 
objectively available. What objectively available meant to Quine in the context of 
translation was available from the third person perspective to someone who did not 
already know the language and who knew nothing further about the speaker. It is the 
inclusion of this last desideratum which perhaps stands out most. The translator is 
denied any knowledge about the speaker bar knowledge of his behaviour and 
whatever knowledge of a speaker’s language can be constructed from this material. 
Both Quine and Davidson accepted the further point that the behavioural evidence 
would not distinguish the contributions of meaning and belief to a speaker’s 
assertions. Quine’s behaviouristic view of the evidence, and Davidson’s concurrence, 
meant neither would consider seriously the possibility of other sources of evidence 
with positive bearing on the contributions of meaning and belief. If there is evidence 
that may be brought to bear on interpretation that supplements the behavioural 
evidence, it may serve to constrain the meanings or beliefs that the interpreter can 
ascribe. We would then be able to begin solving our problem of two unknowns, the 
problem of entanglement, without recourse to DPOC.
When drawing the evidence for the study of language Quine thought of language as 
nothing but a social phenomenon. On Quine’s view, what it is that a speaker means 
could not be illuminated by facts about a speaker’s sensory apparatus, a speaker’s 
mind, or a speaker’s brain, or by any facts made available from empirical psychology 
and linguistics. There are two separate but related arguments extractable from Quine 
for the view that the only evidence relevant to correct translation comes from overt 
verbal behaviour. Here they are termed the acquisition argument and the 
manifestation argument. The term “manifestation” is suggestive of a point of contact 
to be found between Quine’s argument and an argument to be found in Dummett and 
Wright.125 The conviction they share is that there is nothing more to meaning than 
what is manifest in linguistic behaviour.
125 Wright, 1993, pp.13-26.
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Quine’s acquisition argument for Behaviourism starts with a claim about how we 
leam a language. Quine’s major premise is that we leam a language solely through 
observation of overt behaviour and our responsiveness to correction:
Each of us leams his language by observing other people’s verbal behaviour and having his 
own faltering verbal behaviour observed and reinforced or corrected by others.126
Quine’s argument runs as follows:
(1) Language is leamt by observation of verbal behaviour.
(2) No more is available to the translator than is available in learning a language, (suppressed premise)
(3) Therefore, no more evidence is available to the translator than observable verbal behaviour.
Both of the premises are highly dubious and certainly requiring of convincing 
argumentation, for which one would search Quine’s writings in vain. One could view 
Quine’s premise (1) as an empirical claim about language acquisition; it is hard to see 
how else one could view it. Chomsky saw it as having the status of an empirical 
assumption given that no evidence is presented in support of it.127 If seen this way we 
have to question whether it has been fatally undermined by Chomsky’s own work in 
linguistics; empirical research which seems to disconfirm the hypothesis that children 
could come to speak the languages they do on the basis of the limited behavioural 
data they receive. To be valid the argument requires the suppressed premise (2) and 
this premise is false. Even if one accepted premise (1) it would not follow that the 
translator could not find other information useful. We want to allow that there can be 
better and worse translators and in the radical case the best translators should make 
use of whatever evidence is useful to understanding speakers.
What one has acquired when one knows a language is, on Quine’s view, a set of 
dispositions to verbal behaviour. Quine characterizes dispositions to verbal behaviour 
in terms assent and dissent to a network of sentences related to one another and, in
126 Quine, 1987, pp.5.
127 Chomsky, 1975, pp.53.
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part, to stimuli. Chomsky was highly skeptical, for reasons that will become apparent, 
of Quine's account of how we leam a language. One can be impressed by Chomsky’s 
points against Quine even if one does not wholeheartedly endorse Chomsky’s own 
account of language acquisition. His early arguments against Behaviourism placed 
Chomsky himself in such a position:
it seems that there is neither empirical evidence nor any known argument to support any
specific claim about the relative importance of “feedback” from the environment and the
128“independent contribution of the organism” in the process of language acquisition.
Quine famously claimed that in imputing meanings and beliefs to a speaker we go 
beyond what is implied by that speaker’s verbal behaviour:
129we impute our sense of linguistic analogy unverifiably to the native mind.
Quine thought the analogy unverifiable because there are alternative imputations 
inconsistent with one another but consistent with all the evidence. Chomsky took 
issue with Quine’s indeterminacy thesis because it depended on his Behaviourist 
theory of acquisition. Quine and Davidson held that an element of indeterminacy in 
translation arises from the interplay of meaning and belief ascriptions and sought to 
alleviate this indeterminacy by applying a POC. According to both Quine and 
Davidson the indeterminacy survives application of a POC. Chomsky argued that 
there are further determinants to meaning than those identified by Quine, and that the 
indeterminacy can be resolved on an improved understanding of the factors involved 
in language learning. He claimed that there is one true and determinate meaning for 
each sentence of the language settled by the baggage human organisms bring to 
language use. It is not my intention to defend Chomsky’s dismissal of the 
indeterminacy of translation but rather to sketch his alternative picture. On 
Chomsky’s view our minds develop systems of knowledge that determine the status 
of arbitrary physical objects, assigning to these objects syntax, phonetics and
128 Chomsky, 1959.
129 Quine, 1960, pp.72.
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meaning. On this picture a language is a specific function assigning meaning to a vast 
range of physical events, and this function is ultimately realized in physical 
mechanisms. My focus is not on these positive claims, but on how arguments 
against Behaviourist theories of acquisition (and competence) undermine Quine’s 
Behaviouristic delimitation of the evidence available in translation.
Chomsky was unhappy with the notion of similarity required by Quine’s account. 
Speakers are required to find certain sentences and certain stimuli similar and we 
need an explanation of what this consists in. A traditional Behaviourist explanation 
had been that two stimuli are similar when the speaker makes the same sort of 
response to them But we need to know when two responses are of the same sort. This 
explanation of similarity is in danger of turning into a tautology.131 If CX\e.j^ anted to 
define similarity of stimuli in terms of similarity of responses, cculd 
similarity of response* in terms that involve stimuli as closing the loop would be 
unappealing. Quine had a different explanation of similarity. He postulated that we 
possess pre-linguistic, quality spaces. One needs to know more about these quality 
spaces and their nature for Quine’s account to explain anything about how language 
is learnt. What is a quality space? Chomsky offered the following explanation on 
Quine’s behalf.132 A quality space may be thought of as an in-built measure of 
distance, perhaps “restricted to dimensions with physical correlates such as brightness 
or loudness, and distance defined in terms of those physical correlates”.133 Chomsky’s 
point is that we now have an empirical “doctrine of innate spaces” which must face 
the empirical evidence. In reply,134 Quine claimed that there must be such things as 
innate quality spaces as there can be no habit formation without similarity 
dispositions to find things similar. Quine claims that it is the nature of these quality 
spaces that must be experimentally determined, not the issue of whether or not there 
are such things. But surely Quine did not mean to suggest that it is not an empirical
130 Chomsky labels this conception of language “I-language” and claims that it is I-languages that are 
the proper objects of empirical study.
131 Chomksy, 1959.
132 Chomsky, 1975.
133 ibid
134 Quine, 1969b.
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issue whether such quality spaces exist, and if they do exist, what role they play. 
Quine did not meet Chomsky’s objection: his claim about “quality spaces” and the 
role they play in acquisition has not been made to face the evidence or compete with 
alternative hypotheses. Neither did Quine do anything to remedy Chomsky’s concern 
that the nature of a “quality space” remains mysterious.
Chomsky is unhappy for similar reasons with the notion of analogical synthesis 
important to Quine’s account of acquisition. Analogical synthesis is the process of 
abstraction and assembly of parts of sentences. Quine uses the notion to explain how 
we understand sentences not directly tied to stimuli, but:
135this explanation is empty until an account of “analogy” is given, and none exists.
The claim that language learners make such synthesis is also mysterious until a basis 
for this abstraction and assembly is specified and empirically tested. Quine’s refusal 
to look to the contribution of the child leaves us with a superficial account of learning 
on which we attribute a vast and uncomprehended contribution to a step called 
synthesis or generalizatioa This step includes a great deal of what is of interest in the 
study of language learning. Chomsky takes Quine’s view to highlight the danger of 
neglecting the part that the structure of an organism, whether described in biological 
terms or at the level of abstraction Chomsky terms the “mind-brain”, may play in the 
acquisition of language.
Chomsky saw it as an empirical problem to assess what properties of the mind or 
brain determine the nature of our experience, how experience contributes to language 
learning and what we come to believe on the basis of that experience.136 He asks us to 
adopt an attitude of distrust towards the idea that properties of the mind open to 
empirical investigation “impose no conditions on language and theories”.137 Quine’s
135 Chomsky, 1990, pp.589.
136 Chomsky, 1975, pp.64.
137 Chomsky, 1975,pp.65.
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position appeared to him nothing more than a dogma unsupported by evidence about 
language learning. Chomsky’s positive views are in sharp contrast with Quine’s:
it is clear that when we learn a language we are not “learning sentences” or acquiring a
“behavioral repertoire” through training. Rather, we somehow develop certain principles
(unconscious of course) that determine the form and meaning of indefinitely many sentences.
A description of knowledge of language as an associative net constructed by conditioned
138response is in sharp conflict with whatever evidence we have about these matters.
What is the evidence which Chomsky finds so inexplicable for the Behaviorist?
We must deal with the crucial and easily demonstrated fact that what a person knows (in 
knowing a language) is vastly underdetermined by available evidence, and that much of this
knowledge is based on no direct evidence at all There is little doubt that this problem of
139“poverty of stimulus” is in fact the norm rather than the exception.
From an early date Chomsky stated in modest terms the importance that the work in 
linguistics with which he was involved could have for understanding why one 
possesses the language and theory one does:
Although such a study, even if successful, would by no means answer the major problems 
involved in the investigation of meaning and the causation of behaviour, it surely will not be 
unrelated to these the general character of the results of syntactic investigations may be a
corrective to oversimplified approaches the theory of meaning.140h
This is not a defence of a Chomskian conception of language acquisition, or aspects 
of his views to do with innateness, universality or intemality. Rather it is an attempt 
to make palpable the highly speculative and doubtful nature of Quine’s account. 
Quine’s reply to Chomsky illustrates well the level of speculation in which he was 
involved:
138 Chomsky, 1975, pp.64.
139 Chomsky, 1990, pp.593.
140 Chomsky, 1959.
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Language aptitude is innate; language learning, on the other hand, in which that aptitude is put 
to work turns on intersubjectively observable features of human behaviour and its environing 
circumstances, there being no innate language and no telepathy.141
To Chomsky this would have appeared to be merely a restatement of the unjustified 
empirical assumption to which he had accused Quine of adhering. Whether learning 
turns only on observation of behaviour is a matter to be investigated; Chomsky: a 
preponderance of empirical linguists strongly favour a negative answer and stress that 
in the case of language learning:
prediction of the behaviour of a complex organism would require, in addition to information 
about external stimulation, knowledge of the internal structure of die organism, the ways in 
which it processes input information and organizes its own behaviour.142
Behaviourists who tried to explain language acquisition as the activation of pre­
existing aptitudes (which themselves would require much explanation), by stimulus 
and reinforcement, omitted factors of first importance to the scientific study of 
language. They also faced a problem with the claim that regularities in dispositions to 
speech are formed through reinforcement:
It is not easy to find any basis (or, for that matter, to attach very much content) to the claim 
that reinforcing contingencies set up by the verbal community are die single factor responsible 
for maintaining the strength of verbal behaviour. The sources of the “strength” of this 
behaviour are almost a total mystery at present.143
It is conceivable that there could be Behaviourists who do not say that reinforcement 
is responsible for consistency in verbal behaviour. However, Quine contends that 
observable behaviour determines the specific character of language acquisition 
because a child speaks the language of, and receives correction from, the group in 
which he grows up. The argument is superficial because at this level of speculation,
141 Quine, 1969,pp.306.
142 Chomsky, 1959, pp.27.
143 Chomsky, 1959.
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Chomsky points out, one may equally hypothesise that the human organism has 
evolved in such a way that on observing verbal behaviour he miraculously 
internalizes the rules of English grammar. Or that on observing the application of a 
term to certain instances he predicts the extension of that term to complexly related 
instances. Whatever theory of language learning one adopts it must be able to cope 
with the following sorts of data:
Study of the actual observed ability of a speaker to distinguish sentences from nonsentences,
detect ambiguities, etc., apparently forces us to the conclusion that this grammar is of an
extremely complex and abstract character, and that the young child has succeeded in carrying
out what from the formal point of view, at least, seems to be a remarkable type of theory
construction. Furthermore, this task is accomplished in an astonishingly short time, to a large
extent independently of intelligence, and in a comparable way by all children. Any theory of
144learning must cope with these facts.
There is no explanation of these facts in terms of reinforcement or indication of how 
Behaviourist theory could explain these facts in Quine’s writings.
Quine’s manifestation argument, like his acquisition argument, aims to establish that 
the only evidence relevant to translation is behavioural. It starts from the premise that 
there is nothing more to understanding than what is manifest in our use of language. 
Quine has several takes on this argument. The first concerns the basis on which 
speakers are counted as understanding the language:
As long as our command of language fits all external checkpoints, where our utterances or our 
reaction to someone’s utterance can be appraised in the light of some shared situation, so long 
all is well. Our mental life between checkpoints is indifferent to our rating as a master of the 
language.145
In this last sentence, Quine has run two distinct points together. There may be a sense 
in which it is correct to say that our mental life is indifferent to our mastery of the
144 Chomsky, 1959.
145 Quine, 1987, pp.5.
76
language. Whatever is going on in our minds at the level of consciousness we will 
generally count as a master of the language if we perform correctly with the 
language.146 One would not, for example, be counted an incompetent calculator if one 
calculated correct answers but had strange thoughts running through one’s head 
concurrently.147 We might put this by saying that generally verbal behaviour is a 
criterion of understanding language. This view of mastery is still contentious in one 
respect - think, for example, of a man who commands complete mastery of the 
language but has lost his expressive powers.148 But Quine also implies something far 
less plausible which is that our mentality has no impact on, is not a determinant of, 
how we perform with the language.
When one claims that a speaker’s mentality is a determinant of his mastery of the 
language what one is concerned with is not what Wittgenstein described as:
149a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism.
One is not concerned with the postulation of internal mechanisms that have no effect 
on verbal behaviour and our use of language. There may be properties of the mind -  
“internal mechanisms” if you like -  which are crucial determinants of verbal 
behaviour and one’s mastery of the language. Idle wheels are irrelevant to Non- 
Behaviourist and Behaviourist alike. This argument does not establish that there is 
nothing more to mastery, and hence meaning, than is manifest in verbal behaviour 
because it provides no good reason to believe that mentality is indifferent to mastery. 
On the contrary, one might expect our mindedness and our use of language to be 
intimately related, and the former to be a determinant of the latter. The argument that 
one should consider only behavioural evidence because one counts as a master of the 
language on the basis of behaviour, is not only invalid but rests on a doubtful premise 
about the basis on which one comes to count as a master of the language.
146 Although there are interesting questions about whether zombies, creatures that behave as 
competent language users do but have no inner life, count as masters of the language.
147 Wittgenstein makes this point several times in Philosophical Investigations.
148 Chomsky, 1990.
149 Wittgenstein, 2001, sect 271.
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The second tack Quine takes on manifestation is to consider how we habitually 
understand speakers of our own language. One only comes to know what others 
mean, he claims, on the basis of their behaviour. So how, the argument runs, could 
the translator be needy of any other evidence?150 We have seen reason already for 
thinking that the premise that knowledge of language is best explained in terms of the 
observation of behaviour is dubious. If Quine’s claim about how one knows what 
others mean were true then aspects of the speaker that cannot be reflected in their 
behaviour are not relevant to what one learns by observing their behaviour. The 
problem with this argument is that its conclusion might be accepted even by someone 
who rejected Behaviourism. The Behaviourist’s opponent may agree that aspects of 
the speaker that have no resonance in verbal behaviour are not relevant to linguistic 
understanding whilst maintaining that there is an awful lot that plays a determining 
role in language use which is not merely behaviour. In other words there may be a lot 
of non-behavioural factors reflected in our use of language. Aspects of the speaker 
that are irrelevant to the kind of language they speak are irrelevant to the study of 
language; no one denies this.
There may be another strand to Quine’s manifestation argument. Suppose we can 
come to know what it is that someone means on the basis of unsophisticated evidence 
about their behaviour. Allow Quine, for the sake of argument, that this is an accurate 
portrayal of what is involved in understanding: we ascribe everyday, simple meanings 
to people on the basis of readily available, unsophisticated behavioural evidence. 
Quine might think that the possibility of bringing more sophisticated evidence to bear 
on what someone means or believes is precluded by the facts that we come to know 
what familiar people mean on the basis of unsophisticated evidence and that the 
meanings we ascribe to them are generally simple. Therefore, the argument would go, 
more sophisticated scientific knowledge could not be relevant. But this is a mistake. 
More sophisticated evidence could be relevant to getting at the very same simple
150 On the I-language conception, the discovery of I-meanings may require sophisticated techniques. I- 
languages do not have the epistemological properties affiliated to pre-scientific conceptions. See 
Horwich, 1992.
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meanings and beliefs, especially in more radical cases where the speaker is very 
unfamiliar. There may be expert, as opposed to poor, translators who command a 
greater wealth of information about the speaker and his environment, and who are 
more ingenious in translating speakers of varying degrees of familiarity.
There may be an even more serious obstacle for Quine’s manifestation argument 
which can only be touched upon here. McDowell has argued that manifestation 
arguments cannot be successful because taking them seriously makes understanding 
impossible.151 This argument is worth mentioning because its premises are in keeping
152with some prominent ideas in Davidson’s writings and yet Davidson accepts some 
version of the manifestation argument. McDowell’s argument depends on the idea 
that understanding and meaning are normative notions. Normative notions draw on 
standards of correctness, and distinctions between being and merely seeming right. 
One’s meaning or understanding something by an expression requires there being a 
distinction between correct and incorrect uses of that expressioa The lack of such a 
distinction compromises the expression meaning anything at all because without it, 
any use of the expression would count as one’s having understood it and used it in 
accord with its meaning. Quine may not have been impressed by this kind of talk. But 
Davidson agreed that thought and meaning are normative notions requiring a 
distinction between seeming and being right. A premise of Quine’s manifestation 
argument is that understanding can amount to nothing more than what is manifest in 
our linguistic behaviour. The thesis must characterize understanding without 
appealing to a prior command of the language otherwise one could say that a speaker 
manifests their understanding of the language simply by speaking the language. So 
manifestation of understanding must consist in behaviour such as assenting to a 
sentence in observable circumstances -  much as Quine describes it. But what is 
actually manifest in episodes of behaviour? Behaviour can confirm the attribution of 
dispositions,
151 McDowell, 1984, sect 10.
152 2001c in particular.
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but how can we extrapolate to a determinate conception of what the disposition is a
153disposition to do?
How can we extrapolate a determinate disposition to do something from the 
behaviour we observe? We could only extrapolate from the behaviour inductively: x 
has seen the sign-post three times and gone left three times, by induction he is 
disposed to go left at the sign-post. What is not manifest is commitment to a 
determinate pattera If meaning must be fully manifest in behaviour then no 
determinate extrapolation can be fixed upon. The manifestation argument rules out 
the idea that in understanding language one grasps a determinate pattern of use that 
extends beyond finite instances of behaviour -  the idea that there can be correct and 
incorrect uses of expressions. Without this distinction we cannot make sense of 
meaning and understanding.
Behaviourism engenders a lack of curiosity about the relations between human nature 
and both the meanings of the expressions of human language and the beliefs held by 
its speakers. This lack of curiosity is not justified by the fallacious arguments for 
Behaviourism to be found in Quine’s writings. Davidson rejected Quine’s notion of 
stimulus meaning and certainly saw himself as breaking from the Behaviourism he 
associated with that notion. But Davidson’s delimitation of the evidence for 
interpretation closely follows Quine’s; the evidence comes from speaker’s behaviour.
The crucial point on which I am in agreement with Quine might be put: all the evidence for or 
against a theory of truth (interpretation, translation) comes in the form of facts about what 
events or situations in the world cause, or would cause, speakers to assent to, or dissent from, 
each sentence in the speaker’s repertoire. We probably differ on some details. Quine describes 
the events or situations in terms of patterns of stimulation, while I prefer a description in 
terms more like those of the sentence being studied; Quine would give more weight to a 
grading of sentences in terms of observationality than I would; and where he likes assent and 
dissent because they suggest a behaviouristic test, I despair of Behaviourism and accept 
frankly intensional attitudes towards sentences, such as holding true.154
153 McDowell, 1984, p.68.
154 1979, pp.230-1.
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Davidson placed the evidence in much the way Quine had done; even though they 
differed over the terms in which they thought the evidence should be described. The 
point of agreement is apparent in remarks such as:
Only by studying the pattern of assents to sentences can we decide what is meant and what 
believed.155
The ultimate evidence ........  for the correctness of a truth theory we must presume lies in
available facts about how speakers use the language. When I say available, I mean publicly 
available -  available not only in principle, but in fact to anyone who is capable of 
understanding the speaker or speakers of the language.156
Davidson’s condition that the evidence must be available, in feet, to anyone, may 
make the Radical Interpreter’s task a mundane one. How much evidence is really 
available to absolutely anyone who is capable of speaking a language? What carries 
over from Quine is an assumption of “observationality”. This is the assumption that 
meanings and propositional attitudes must be discoverable by interpreters privy to 
nothing but observable verbal behaviour, even if one holds, as Davidson does, that the 
meanings and attitudes are not reducible to that behaviour:
I assume that an observer can under favourable circumstances tell what beliefs, desires, and
intentions an agent has..............  die observationality assumption does not imply that it is
possible to state explicitly what evidence is necessary or sufficient to determine the presence
of a particular thought; there is no suggestion that thinking can somehow be reduced
definitionally to something else  Nor does the observationality assumption amount to
Behaviourism. Propositional attitudes can be discovered by an observer who witnesses
157nothing but behaviour without the attitudes being in any way reducible to behaviour.
One might try to defend Davidson’s views on the evidence relevant to interpretation 
by claiming that they represent merely the stipulation of a radical case. One might say
155 2001b, pp.xviii.
156 1988, pp. 176.
157 1982, pp.99-100.
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that Davison has described the radical case such that this is all that is available to the 
Radical Interpreter. But one should bear the following in mind. Davidson’s intention 
was to describe the radical case so as to get clear on the objectively available 
evidence, putting subjective elements to one side. Even if beliefs and meanings are in 
everyday cases discoverable by observing verbal behaviour, the fact that they are so 
discoverable does not imply that no other objective evidence would have been 
efficacious in their discovery. One should question the wisdom of the way Davidson 
has stipulated the evidence to which we are exposed in the radical case. Rather than 
accepting that verbal behaviour in observable circumstances is all that is objectively 
available in the radical case because that is how the radical case has been described, 
one should be suspicious that Davidson has described the evidence available to the 
Radical Interpreter in a way that makes his project less interesting than it might be.
4.5 Davidson and Lewis: Lewis’s Radical Interpreter, Physicalism and 
Determination
David Lewis conceived of the task of Radical Interpretation in a rather different way 
to Davidson Lewis did not think that Radical Interpretation is a matter of how an 
interpreter could work out a speaker’s beliefs and meanings as a real-life task. He 
saw this as the epistemological counterpart of the real issue. He thought that the real 
issue was how the facts could determine what that speaker meant by his words and 
what he believed. Lewis conceived of the relevant facts as the totality of physical 
facts about a speaker. So Lewis’ question was: given the constraints of all the 
physical facts how can we solve for a speaker’s meanings and beliefs? He thought 
that discerning some general principles that could take us from all the physical facts 
to an interpretation would amount to stating a general theory of persons. This general 
theory would offer a set of principles that tell us how belief, meaning, behaviour and 
sensory input relate to one another.
Lewis’s principles are five-fold and we need not enter into the details of each of them 
here. Amongst them, Lewis includes a POC. He calls it the “Improved POC”.
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“Improved” because there is a provision to make room for explicable error. Davidson 
found this provision in keeping with DPOC as he had conceived of it:
The improved principle of charity says why assume that Karl is right when you can see that
he’s behind a post and can’t notice what’s going on behind it, and so forth. Surely we can do
better by allowing for explicable error. I agree. The improved principle of charity, insofar as it
says there are cases where you can make exceptions right from the beginning, is what I 
158espouse.
On Davidson’s view the attributions of belief we make at the outset are “something 
we do in order to get our method working and not something independently testable 
belief by belief.”159 Davidson requires of interpreters that in order to share subject 
matter with speakers they must share many beliefs and it may be the case that an 
explicable but false belief on the part of the speaker ensures more understanding, 
more shared belief with the interpreter, than inexplicable falsehoods.
Lewis adopts a broader construal of the evidence than Davidson’s. He claims that 
they relevant facts are all the physical facts. But even Lewis draws the evidence too 
narrowly and this is one way in which the suggestions of this thesis may be 
distinguished from what Lewis was pressing for. Firstly, he admits only evidence 
described in physical terms, despite his own suggestion that, as ontological parsimony 
is not the topic, we may as well assume any entities that will be of use. Secondly, he 
claims that as the concepts of belief desire and meaning are common concepts “the 
theory that implicitly defines them had better be common property too”.160 He thinks 
that the theory must be platitudinous, only putting common sense in a coherent and 
perspicuous way. Therefore his theory cannot draw on evidence that would only be 
available to those with special knowledge, because this goes beyond common sense. 
He thinks that scientific evidence must be barred “on pain of changing the subject”.161 
Whilst we may not need any such knowledge to acquire the concepts of belief, desire
158 1974c, pp.283.
159 1974c, pp.283.
160 Lewis, 1974.
161 Lewis, 1974.
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and meaning, such knowledge may be relevant to working out what it is that someone 
believes, desires or means, especially if that person is very unfamiliar to us. The 
concept of belief may be a commonly owned one but working out what exactly Karl 
Marx believed may be a very tricky matter, and similarly working out what a Martian 
believes, if anything at all, may draw on knowledge not available to all those who 
have the concept of belief. Why should there not be better and worse interpreters, 
where the best may be distinguished by their command of a wealth of information 
about human nature and their ingenuity in interpreting unfamiliar people? Where 
explicable error is Lewis’s concern, his claims for the insuperability of folk 
psychology amount to the claim that error can only be explained in ways that do not 
draw on special knowledge. If this were straightforwardly correct then he would put 
empirical psychologists out of a job.
Davidson’s reply to Lewis illuminates his position on the evidence available to 
interpreters and the way it is to be utilised.162 Davidson notes that in common with 
Lewis he looks to make speakers intelligible rather than maximize agreement 
between speaker and interpreter. Davidson is sympathetic to Lewis’s claim that this 
will involve taking into account probable errors due to bad positioning (equally, 
probable successes due to good positioning), deficient (or super-efficient) sensory 
apparatus, and differences in background knowledge. Davidson is amenable to Lewis 
suggestion that interpretations be checked against non-verbal as well as verbal 
behaviour:
there is no chance of telling when a sentence is held true without being able to attribute
163desires and being able to describe actions as having complex intentions.
As has been pointed out already, Davidson equivocates over whether any of this 
shows that the evidential base as he construed it was inadequate. He admits that it 
may be. But this is confusing. Perhaps it is a point of emphasis and Davidson thought 
that the kind of factors Lewis was making explicit were not excluded from the
162 1974c
163 1975, pp. 162.
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framework he had described. It is hard to square this with the behaviouristic 
statements about the interpreter’s evidential base quoted in 4.4.
A clearer instance of disagreement lay in their respective answers to the question of 
how physical descriptions of speakers are related to descriptions of their beliefs and 
meanings. It was Lewis’ contention that a correct and complete physical description 
of the speaker determines that speaker’s beliefs. Davidson distinguished two senses 
that determine could have here. In Lewis’ sense, determination means that given a 
complete physical description of the speaker one could in some way read off an 
agent’s beliefs and meanings. Davidson did not accept that knowledge of a complete 
physical description of a speaker could yield knowledge of a speaker’s beliefs and 
meanings. He did not accept that a speaker’s beliefs were determined by the totality 
of physical facts about a speaker in this sense.
concepts like those of belief and meaning are, in a fundamental way, not reducible to
physical, neurological, or even behaviouristic concepts.164
What Davidson did believe was that beliefs supervened on the totality of physical 
facts about a speaker and his environment; one way of putting this is to say that there 
could be no change in a speaker’s beliefs without some change in the physicality of 
the speaker and his environment. It is interesting to consider how Lewis’ method of 
interpretation would work. One might wonder how his view of the determination of 
belief and meaning by the physical facts fits with his dictum that the interpreter 
cannot make use of esoteric scientific knowledge. He would have to say that belief 
and meaning were determined by the mundane physical facts, but it is far from clear 
how this could be so. One might wonder what role his principles of interpretation can 
play when what he claims is really required by the interpreter is a survey of the 
physical facts.
164 1974a, pp. 154.
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My main concern is Davidson’s openness or otherwise to the view that there may be 
information given in a natural description of a speaker and his environment that 
hi*, meftvdl , - One need not take a position on the question of
determination to agree with Lewis on this point. All one need accept is the broad and 
seemingly uncontroversial thesis that knowledge of a speaker’s nature may be 
relevant to assessing what his beliefs may be. This is consistent with Davidson’s 
Anti-Reductionist requirement. Davidson, referring first to theories of meaning and 
belief and then to the physical and other sciences, takes it that the requirement:
sets these theories forever apart from those that describe mindless objects, or describe objects
as mindless.165
Perhaps he sets them too far apart, further apart than Anti-Reductionism requires. The 
psychological sciences, as practiced, seem to make use of the notions both of 
intentional notions, and of more physicalistic notions.
There is empirical evidence that Davidson has effectively thrown away. Against 
Lewis, this claim should not be restricted to evidence described in scrupulously 
physical terms. Davidson seems not to have taken this idea very seriously. Perhaps 
this is because he denied that the whole evidential basis for interpretation could come 
from the physical description of a speaker. But he does not seem to notice that finding 
physical and other non-behavioural evidence relevant does not commit one to saying 
that we can give a reduction of belief and meaning. Just finding some physical 
evidence relevant does not even commit us to saying that all the evidence relevant to 
interpretation can be described in non-intentional terms. Some of the empirical 
evidence relevant to understanding a speaker may come from the human sciences. 
Such evidence may not turn out to be describable in brute physical terms; fields such 
as empirical psychology and linguistics have theoretical terminology of their own and 
may make use of intentional and non-intentional language.
165 ibid
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Of course, there are questions about where exactly such extra evidence may come 
from, what form it may take and how it might be utilised by the Radical Interpreter. 
Let us bear in mind that there are many areas of empirical work in which people take 
themselves to be furthering our understanding of minded, language users. It would be 
surprising to say the least if they had nothing to say to us on such matters as when and 
how certain beliefs were formed in subjects, what factors are relevant to the kinds of 
language spoken by subjects and how human physiology relates to a subjects’ 
interaction with their environment. It seems careless if the interpreter is discarding 
such information in forming his hypotheses and implausible that such evidence is 
irrelevant. There is a question about how such evidence is utilised in discerning and 
explaining a subject’s beliefs; we should not assume that there is a single, uniform 
answer. The claim is not that the findings of empirical psychology or any other 
science, actually or potentially, give us unproblematic access to the fine grained 
propositional attitudes of speakers. What is being claimed is that such knowledge can 
be relevant to pinning down a speaker’s beliefs; it can constrain us in the beliefs that 
we can plausibly attribute. To the extent that empirical knowledge can hold belief or 
meaning fixed it leaves DPOC redundant.
In making erroneous beliefs and utterances explicable we are, as Quine noted, doing 
applied psychology:
we’re thinking: How would this man have learned his own language? How likely is it that he 
as a child would have picked up a language that had such funny complex twists when
translated over into English? ..... How would he learn it, from the point of view of
conditioned reflexes and the rest?166
Empirical work that sets out to answer such questions can, at a minimum, act as a 
constraint on the beliefs and meanings the interpreter attributes and to the extent that 
it does so it is fulfilling the role of DPOC.
166 Quine, 1974.
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Davidson saw that bringing in information from descriptions of a speaker’s non­
verbal behaviour can be important in understanding verbal and non-verbal behaviour:
167if the way I described my method left that out, then that is indeed a fault.
But he implies in the remark below that such information is only to be used as a
method of checking once one already has a theory of interpretation. Davidson’s 
thought is that the speaker’s actions described in our language rest on a certain
interpretation of that speaker’s beliefs and desires; and this seems correct.
In other words there’s something to test the theory against besides just speech behaviour and
that’s the rest of behaviour. And I don’t say that in passing as if it were only a little difference.
168I think it’s a big and important one.
The difference is bigger still when we view the relevant evidence more broadly as 
including non-verbal, non-behavioural evidence. The difference in the theory we get 
will be bigger when we draw on verbal and non-verbal behaviour, the findings of 
empirical psychology, linguistics, optics, biology and the rest.
167 1974, pp.283.
168 ibid
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5. Some Positive Suggestions and Some Conclusions
Reviewing the remarks of the fourth section what is presented is largely a negative 
claim about Davidson’s views on interpretation and the nature of the evidence 
available to the interpreter. The major claim is that Davidson has characterized the 
evidence too narrowly and that there may be more scope for the use of interesting 
information about speakers than his method makes room for. There are positive 
claims that can be extracted from this critique; namely that the evidence for 
interpretation should be viewed in an open-minded and broad way, and that we 
should be alert to the fact that evidence from the human sciences often discriminates 
between the contributions of meaning and belief to verbal behaviour. If the 
contributions can be distinguished, even if one employed some principle like DPOC 
on pragmatic grounds when other evidence is lacking, DPOC no longer has the status 
of an a priori necessity of interpretation. The critique is also suggestive of a certain 
way of thinking about bringing evidence to bear on interpretation. Putting the 
discernment of meaning and the Chomskian approach to one side, here is a sketch of 
one way this might go.169
The English language has an apparatus of individuation including, amongst other 
things, expressions of identity and demonstratives. An expression can only be 
regarded as a predicate if it interacts with the apparatus of individuation, in other 
words, if it is predicated of something. Quine claimed that the stimulus meanings of 
the sentences in which predicates occur provide the only evidence for the extension of 
the predicate. On Davidson’s view the observable conditions of assent and dissent 
behaviour provide the only evidence but there are constraints on the extension we 
could construe the predicate as having owing to the compositionality of a theory of 
meaning. Both found the identification of the native’s apparatus of individuation to be
169 My argument has been that one should be open-minded about the sources of evidence for 
interpretation. My examples, whilst loosely drawn from empirical sciences, lack the depth and subtlety 
that some background in those fields would provide.
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empirically underdetermined -  with suitable adjustments elsewhere we could treat,
1T0say, the identity predicate as some distinct equivalence relation
A cognitive psychologist might form the empirical hypothesis that a speaker’s 
individuative apparatus is dependent on, amongst other things, his perceptual 
mechanisms. So whether some expression is that of identity or of some distinct 
equivalence relation would be dependent, in part at least, on factors to do with the 
subject’s vision. If this hypothesis could be supported by empirical data, then in 
determining the relation of a native’s individuative apparatus to our own we ought to 
find out such things as how that native’s eyes function: do they function in much the 
way that ours do? Are the mechanics of our eyes that allow us to see objects in three 
dimensions, to see in colour and to have uninterrupted sight all reproduced in the 
native? Are their eyes and other sensory organs connected up with their brains and 
nervous system in much the way ours are? How does the language spoken by the 
native vary when these factors are varied -  do peculiarities or deficiencies have a 
discernable effect? With Behaviourism out the way, the answers to all these questions 
and more are relevant to understanding a speaker, and interpreting his individuative 
expressions. Whether such factors are determinants of the way a speaker individuates 
becomes an issue to which empirical knowledge is admissible. It may turn out that 
people with very similar perceptual mechanisms, psychological capabilities and 
neural make-ups can come to individuate in vastly different ways, but we should not 
prejudge such questions.
If one learns that a native speaker’s eyes work so as to track enduring, medium-sized 
objects against contrasting backgrounds then that may be relevant to the matter of 
what the individuative apparatus of his language is and which beliefs one could 
plausibly attribute to him on given occasions. If one discovered that the native’s eyes 
work so as to track enduring and relatively homogenous objects as wholes against 
contrasting backgrounds, as opposed to tracking the background or the gaps between 
objects, we might take this as a hypothetical maxim of interpretation or as one piece
170 1979b. Quine, 1969a.
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of defeasible evidence for interpretation. Here is what Quine had to say about the 
translator who tries to make use of such information:
If he were to become conscious of this maxim, he might celebrate it as one of the linguistic 
universals, or traits of all languages, and he would have no trouble pointing out its 
psychological plausibility. But he would be wrong; die maxim is his own imposition on what
is objectively indeterminate. It is a very sensible imposition and I would recommend no other.
171But I am making a philosophical point.
This remark is hard to construe but the “philosophical point” must be one about 
Behaviourist scruples. Quine says that the hypothetical maxim would be an 
imposition on what is indeterminate but put like that it seems he is taking the 
indeterminacy of translation as a premise from which to argue that no other 
information could be objective evidence for translation. But then he has made a 
mistake: the indeterminacy thesis is a consequence of his Behaviourism not the 
grounds for it. Consider what would follow if it were true that such hypothetical 
maxims about speakers could only ever be our own imposition. The point would 
extend not only to interpretation of speakers’ apparatus of individuation but to many 
of the generalizations of empirical psychology and linguistics. The question to which 
we are owed an answer is why the knowledge acquired in empirical psychology can 
never be objective evidence in translation or interpretation and only ever be rule of 
thumb denied objective status. It is hard to explain why the philosopher who thought 
epistemology should fell into place as a chapter of natural science was so dogmatic 
about language.
Davidson’s method suffers as a consequence of Quine’s behaviouristic influence. But 
what Davidson has provided is a framework for thinking about language that can be 
separated from this behaviouristic view of the relevant evidence. To return to the 
three conditions on a theory of meaning which Davidson set out; it is his attempt to 
meet condition two that has been criticised. The requirement was that a theory of 
meaning be confirmable without detailed knowledge of the propositional attitudes of
171 Quine, 1969a, pp.34.
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the speaker. This thesis took issue with Davidson’s claim that there is no way into a 
speaker’s meanings or beliefs independently of one another but left the over-arching 
Davidsonian framework in tact. So there is room for an approach that accepts the 
framework provided by Davidson for thinking about issues in the philosophy of 
language whilst taking a broader view of the evidence relevant to the study of 
language.
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